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Abstract
Due to the broadcast nature, wireless links are open to malicious intrusions from out-
siders, which makes the security issues a critical concern in the wireless communications
over them. Physical-layer security techniques, which are based on the Shannon’s uncon-
ditional secrecy model, are effective in addressing the security issue while meeting the
required performance level. According to the Wyner’s wiretap channel model, to achieve
unconditionally security communication, the first step is to build up a wiretap channel
with better channel quality between the legitimate communication peers than that of the
eavesdropper; and the second step is to employ a robust security code to ensure that the
legitimate users experience negligible errors while the eavesdropper is subject to 0.5 error
probability.
Motivated by this idea, in this thesis, we build wiretap channels for the single antenna
systems without resorting to the spatial degree in commonly observed the multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems. Firstly, to build effective wiretap channels, we de-
sign a novel scheme, called multi-round two-way communications (MRTWC). By taking
feedback mechanisms into the design of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes, our
scheme adds randomness to the feedback signals from the destination to keep the eaves-
dropper ignorant while adding redundancy with the LDPC codes so that the legitimate
receiver can correctly receive and decode the signals. Then, the channel BERs are specif-
ically quantified according to the crossover probability in the case of Binary Symmetric
Channel (BSC), or the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the case of AWGN and Rayleigh
channels. Thus, the novel scheme can be utilized to address the security and reliability.
Meanwhile, we develop a cross-layer approach to building the wiretap channel, which is
suitable for high dynamic scenarios. By taking advantage of multiple parameters freedom
in the discrete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT) for single antenna systems, the pro-
posed scheme introduces a distortion parameter instead of a general signal parameter for
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wireless networks based on DFRFT. The transmitter randomly flip-flops the uses of the
distortion parameter and the general signal parameter to confuse the eavesdropper. An
upper-layer cipher sequence will be employed to control the flip-flops. This cryptograph-
ic sequence in the higher layer is combined with the physical layer security scheme with
random parameter fipping in DFRFT to guarantee security advantages over the main
communication channel.
As the efforts on the second step, this thesis introduces a novel approach to generate
security codes, which can be used for encoding with low complexity by taking advantage
of a matrix general inverse algorithm. The novel constructions of the security codes are
based on binary and non-binary resilient functions. With the proposed security codes, we
prove that our novel security codes can ensure 0.5 error probability seen by the wiretapper
while close to zero by the intended receiver if the error probability of the wiretapper’s
channel is over a derived threshold. Therefore, the unconditionally secure communication
of legitimate partners can be guaranteed. It has been proved mathematically that the
non-binary security codes could achieve closer to the security capacity bound than any
other reported short-length security codes under BSC.
Finally, we develop the framework of associating the wiretap channel building ap-
proach with the security codes. The advantages between legitimate partners are ex-
tended via developing the security codes on top of our cross-layer DFRFT and feedback
MRTWC security communication model. In this way, the proposed system could ensure
almost zero information obtained by the eavesdroppers while still keeping rather lower
error transmissions for legitimate users. Extensive experiments are carried out to verify
the proposed security schemes and demonstrate the feasibility and implement ability. An
USRP testbed is also constructed, under which the physical layer security mechanisms
are implemented and tested. Our study shows that our proposed security schemes can
be implemented in practical communications settings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Securing communications is a challenging task. A first attempt at security involves
learning basic cryptography, and applying encryption algorithms to make messages un-
intelligible to adversaries. However, rarely is the task of securing a message exchange
so simple. When one steps back and contemplates how to secure the exchange of com-
munications, one realizes that the challenge is fundamentally one of building a complete
solution. The classical cryptography security methods are built without consideration to
how communication takes place.
On the other side, all the classical cryptography schemes which are built on the
upper layers can be broken if the computing resource and time are unlimited. Shannon
[1] introduced the classic unbroken model of a cryptosystem as the unconditional security
system and presented one time pad scheme as an example of the unconditional security
system. However, it is impractical because the length of the key is same as the length of
plaintext.
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In fact, the classical cryptography schemes ignore the most fundamental of communi-
cation layers — the physical layer, whereby devices communicate through the encoding
and modulation of information into waveforms. The cryptographic protocols are de-
signed assuming that the physical layer has already been established and is error free.
Cryptographic techniques may be used to provide security in a mobile environment, but
these techniques do not directly leverage the unique properties of the wireless domain to
address security threats. The physical properties of the wireless medium are a power-
ful source of domain-specific information that can be used to complement and enhance
traditional security mechanisms.
The built-in security of the physical-layer is defined as that physical-layer transmis-
sions guarantee Low Probability-of-Interception (LPI) based on transmission properties
such as modulations, coding, signals and channels, without resorting to source data en-
cryption, which is an approach to realize the the unconditionally security communication
technology [1].
On the other hand, the physical-layer security is a novel approach to solve the wireless
communication security [2, 3]. For the broadcasting nature of wireless communication, a
eavesdropper can overhear the transmission. Thus, this unique physical-layer weakness
calls for innovative physical-layer security designs in future mobile communication system,
which aroused a lot of attention in recent years [2]-[8].
Wyner [9]-[11] first proposed the wiretap channel as an physical layer security model,
in which a fact was proved that the unconditional security can be realised by taking
advantages of the Security Codes (SCs) when the eavesdropper channel is a degraded
version of the legitimate channel. From practical perspectives, however, it is generally
hard to guarantee that the adversary’s channel is noisier than the one taken by the
legitimate partners. It is possible that the adversary’s channel is better than that of
legitimate partners.
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Following this idea, many researches focused on the MIMO system [12], [13]-[16] are
invested. The beamforming [17, 29, 18] and the artificial noise (AN) methods [19] are
popular methods to construct the advanced main channel. Especially, there has been
a great interest on the information-theoretic secrecy capacity of MIMO communication.
Khisti and Wornell [20], [21], have discussed the achievable secrecy rate with beam-
forming in a multiple-input-single-output multiple-eavesdropper wiretap channel. The
transmitter could directionally launch the optimal beamforming to create the biggest
channel advantage for legitimate user. Khisti and Wornell [21], given an upper bound
of achievable secrecy rate for the multiple-input-multiple-output and multiple-antenna
eavesdropper (MIMOME) case in the asymptotic regime via signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
under such environment. The investigations on MIMO secrecy capacity were extended
to various secure communication scenes such as the MIMO broadcast wiretap channel
[22], some relay, and cooperate communication [23]-[28]. Ammari and Fortier [29] com-
pared the secrecy of MIMO system employing transmit beamforming with maximum
ratio combining (MRC) at legitimate receiver and either MRC or select combining (SLC)
at the eavesdropper. By combining the CSI of both legitimates and eavesdroppers, the
secure MIMO beamforming (MB) designs [20],[18] can calculate the optimum beamform-
ing to weaken eavesdropper interception signal as much as possible meanwhile keeping
the intended receiver signal at a special required quality level. the artificial noise (AN)
methods [19] are considered mostly for this case by transmitting AN in the null space of
the legitimate channel to obstruct the illegal receivers. On the basis of this, the quality
of service (QoS)-based physical-layer security system [18],[100],[101] are usually consid-
ered focused on using only enough power to guarantee a certain QoS for Bob, and then
use the remaining power to generate the artificial interference [101]. However, in some
power limited system, the transmitter has to allocate part of power to send the AN, that
may reduce the transmit efficiency and increase the computational complexity. Generally
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in the AN system, the legitimates could hardly guarantee the eavesdropper BER close
to 0.5 when the power of AN is limited, and some secret information may leak to the
eavesdropper.
Another important factor is that a practical and implementable capacity approaching
wiretap security code has never been available. Wyner [9] first introduced coset codes
based on a random construction to solve the particular case when the main channel is
noiseless and the wiretap channel is noisy BSC channel. However, no effective encoding
and decoding algorithm was developed, such that the coset coding scheme can hardly be
practically used. The only good results of security codes from polar codes and LDPC
codes are too long to performance under wireless environment [31]-[35].
Therefore, building the advantage channel for the legitimate partners by the practical
schemes is the first target of this thesis; while the novel security code construction meth-
ods will be investigated in the second step. By MIMO approaches to build the advanced
channel [36]-[49] is a popular research area and be investigated widely. In some scenarios
such as Device-to-Device (D2D) communication system [50]-[54], it is hard to support the
multiple-antenna. How to build the advanced channel under the single antenna system?
Maurer [55] is the first person to try to answer this problem and presents a feedback
method to build an advantage for the main channel without MIMO scheme. In this
thesis, we extend this method to Multiple Rounds Two-Way Communication (MRTWC)
method for building a wiretap channel with larger advantages. We also develop the dis-
crete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT) [56, 57] cross-layer approach to build the
advanced channel of the main channel under the single antenna system, which is suitable
for the channel rapid variations scenarios such as moving at high speed. Meanwhile,
this thesis explores developing the low-complexity encoding and decoding short-length
security coding scheme via the resilient fanction [58, 59, 60] for wireless communication
applications.
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To achieve unconditional communications, the first step is to build up a practical
wiretap channel by keeping better channel quality between the legitimate communication
peers than that of the eavesdropper; while the second step is to achieve the unconditional
secure communication by a robust security code scheme. However, the method for es-
tablishing such channel model and combining with the practice secret code [61]-[65], is
not so obvious. we are motivated to investigate unconditionally secure communication-
s building based on Wyner’s model, where a wiretap channel is created first by using
the approached of multi-round two-way communications and the DFRFT cross-layer
communication systems, followed by novel constructed security codes from the resilient
functions.
1.2 Contribution
The contribution of this thesis is listed as follows
• A novel wiretap channel built method called MRTWC is proposed, in which ma-
nipulating feedback mechanisms adds randomness to the transmitting signals from
the destination for keeping the eavesdropper ignorant and redundancy is added and
encoded by the LDPC codes such that a legitimate receiver can correctly receive
and decode the signals;
• BERs of the proposed MRTWC method are derived according to the crossover
probability in the case of BSC, or the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the case of
AWGN and Rayleigh channels;
• The representation of bit Log-likelihood Ratios (LLR) for optimal soft information
decoding and demodulation is extracted;
5
Organization
• A low complexity encoding method of security codes is developed by taking advan-
tage of a matrix general inverse algorithm, which is suitable to all kinds of coset
security codes;
• Several families of binary and non-binary security codes with low complexity are
constructed by the binary and non-binary security resilient functions;
• The threshold probabilities of novel security codes are derived, which provide the
strong security proof for the proposed security codes
• A cross-layer approach to build advantages of the main channel via DFRFT is
proposed, in which the transmitter randomly flip-flops between the distorted signal
parameter and the general signal parameter for confusing the attacker. An upper-
layer pseudorandom sequence will be employed to control the flip-flops process;
• The security communication system model that combined the DFRFT cross-layer
approach with the security codes is given.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the Shannon’s unconditional
seurity model is given. Followed this model, Wyner is introduced, which is the first model
to to realize the unconditional security model by the condition that is the main channel
has advantage over the eavesdropper’s channel. Then the security capacity that measures
the advantage of the legitimate partner is introduced. Finally, a two-step unconditional
security model is given, in which the first step is build the advanced main channel and
followed step is to choose a suitable security codes.
Chapter 3 gives the details about building the wiretap channel by using feedback
and LDPC codes. Most results focused on the MIMO approaches to build the advanced
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channel. However, in some scenarios such as Device-to-Device (D2D) communication
system, it is hard to support the multiple antennaes. By using feedback mechanisms
adds randomness to the destination signals to degrade the eavesdroppers’ channel and
the manipulating several times feedback extends such degradation while the redundancy
that is added by the LDPC codes encoding can let a legitimate receiver correctly receive
and decode the signals. By this way the advantage of the main channel can be obtained
without resorting to the MIMO scheme. The security capacity of such wiretap channel can
be adjusted via setting the feedback rounds. BERs of the novel method are specifically
quantified according to the crossover probability in the case of BSC, or the SNR in the
case of AWGN and Rayleigh channels. The exact representation of bit Log-likelihood
Ratios (LLR) is derive, which is necessary for optimal soft information decoding and
demodulation.
The proposed novel security codes are described in Chapter 4. Firstly, Wyner’s coset
security codes are introduced. A novel encoding scheme with low complexity is proposed
via a matrix general inverse algorithm, which can also provide low complexity benefit to
Wyner’s coset security codes and all other kinds of security codes. Then by manipulating
both binary and non-binary resilient functions, novel security codes are generated. In
particular, the proposed non-binary encoding construction is practically implementable
due to low complexity and short code lengths, and is proved to yield the best achievable
performance among all the reported short-length security codes over BSC. The threshold
probabilities of novel security codes are derived, which provide the strong security proof
for the proposed security codes. Finally, subsequently, the preliminary numerical results
by combining the proposed wiretap model and the security codes are given.
In Chapter 5, a cross-layer approach to achieve unconditional communication security
via DFRFT is investigated. The novel scheme introduces a distorted signal parameter
instead of a general signal parameter for wireless networks based on DFRFT system. The
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transmitter randomly flip-flops between the distorted signal parameter and the general
signal parameter for confusing the attacker. An upper-layer cipher sequence will be
employed to control the flip-flops process. The cryptographic sequence in the higher layer
is combined with the physical layer security scheme using random parameters fipping of
DFRFT to guarantee security advantages for the main channel. The advantages between
legitimate partners building from the cross-layer scheme are extended via developing the
security codes on top of our cross-layer DFRFT security communication model, aiming
to achieve an error-free legitimate channel while preventing the eavesdropper from any
useful information. Thus, a strong secure model is built. The extensive experiments are
illustrated to verify the proposed security systems and demonstrate its feasibility and
implement ability.
An USRP testbed of the unconditional security system is presented in Chapter 6,
which is consisted of 5 sets of equipments. One equipment plays the role of the base
station and other four sets equipment alternately play the role of the legitimate receivers
and Eves. Security communication between users are successfully established and per-
formance of this USRP platform shows that the security condition 2.3 and reliability 2.4
can be realized in the actual environment.
Finally, we conclude the proposal and outline the future research plans in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Unconditionally Security
Communication Model
In this chapter, based on the theories of Shannon and Wyner, the two-step realized
unconditional security model is given. According to Wyner’s model, if and only if the
eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the physical layer
security can be realized by certain security encoding and decoding scheme. Therefore,
the first step is build the advanced main channel, whose superiority is measured by the
security capacity which is also presented in this chapter.
2.1 Reliability and Security Condition of the Uncon-
ditionally Security Communication
Unconditionally security communication is based on the perfect secrecy model by Shan-
non [1], which is the strongest possible notion of security of a cryptosystem in effective
resolving the boundary, efficiency, and link reliability issues. We will consider the follow-
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ing scenario, which is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Alice wants to send a private message to
Bob, which should be kept perfectly secret from Eve. Eve listens and tries to decode the
message that Alice sends to Bob.
Figure 2.1: Communication system with a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob)
and an eavesdropper (Eve).
The source produces a message S = [s1, s2, · · · , sm], and encodes this message as a
vector X = [x1, x2, · · · , xn], such that X = f(S). This vector is transmitted over the
communication main channel and received as Y = [y1, y2, · · · , yn] by the destination.
The eavesdropper has access to t(t < n) symbols of X through a wiretap channel denoted
as Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zn]. The destination and eavesdropper can decode information as
Sˆ = [sˆ1, sˆ2, · · · , sˆm] and S˜ = [s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m] from Y and Z, respectively.
A system has a perfect secrecy if and only if the plaintext message S is statistically
independent of the ciphertext Z, i.e., I(S;Z) = 0. In the classic model of a cryptosystem
introduced by Shannon [1], both the sender and the intended receiver share a common
secret key that is unknown to the wiretapper, and this key is used to encrypt and decrypt
the message S at the sender and receiver, respectively. Shannon considered a scenario
where both the intended receiver and the wiretapper have direct access to the transmitted
signal. If the signal received by the wiretapper is Z , unconditional security is achieved if
S and Z are statistically independent. With m −→∞, if the error rate of the destination
and eavesdropper are:
10
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Pme =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Pr(sˆi 6= si) (2.1)
Pwe =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Pr(s˜i 6= si) (2.2)
The two conditions for security communication are:
Pme −→ 0 (2.3)
Pwe −→ 0.5 (2.4)
Condition (2.3) is called reliability condition which implies that X must be solely deter-
mined by S. Condition (2.4) is called security condition which ensures an eavesdropper
unable to receive any useful information from the t intercepted symbols. The eavesdrop-
per obtains no information about the source, and the system obtained perfect secrecy,
which means that the transmitter can send information to the legitimate receiver in
virtually unconditional secrecy without sharing a secret key with the legitimate receiver.
2.2 Wyner’s Model
A famous approach for achieving Shannon’s unconditional security is by Wyner’s model
[9, 10, 11]. Wyner introduced the wire tap channel, which has matured into a system
depicted in Figure 2.2. In a wiretap channel, the honest parties Alice and Bob are
separated by a main channel. The important modification when compared to Shannon’s
study of security is that any eavesdropper observes information transmitted by Alice
through the wiretapper’s channel. The main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are
assumed to be Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs). Wyner [9] showed that if the
eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main channel condition (2.3) and
11
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condition (2.4) can be realized by certain security encoding and decoding scheme. Under
this condition, it is possible to establish a perfectly secure source-destination link without
relying on a pre-shared secret key.
Figure 2.2: Block diagram of a Wyner’s model.
2.3 Security Capacity
In this section, we briefly recap the results of [66, 67] to provide a simple expression
of the secrecy capacity Cs in the case where the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel are symmetric DMCs and the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded with respect
to the main channel.
The notation of secrecy capacity, as introduced by [9], has an operational meaning
of being the maximum possible rate of information transmission between Alice and Bob
that still enables Eve to be kept totally ignorant. The secrecy capacity Cs for a general
wiretap channel can be calculated as follows [66]:
Cs = max
{
[I(S ;Y )− I(S ;Z )], 0
}
(2.5)
where the inner maximum is over all possible random variables S in joint distribution
with X,Y, and Z such that S → X → (Y ,Z ) is a Markov chain. Note that Cs could
turn out to be zero in cases where the maximization over S → X → (Y ,Z ) turns out
12
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to be negative. At present, the calculation of secrecy capacity is an unsolved problem
when the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are general DMCs. However,
the calculation of secrecy capacity can be simplified for some special cases that impose
restrictions on the wiretap channel with respect to the main channel.
If I(S ;Y ) ≥ I(S ;Z ) for all Markov chains S → X → (Y , the main channel is said
to be less noisy than the wire tap channel. Then [66]:
Cs = max
PX (x)
[I(S ;Y )− I(S ;Z )] (2.6)
where the maximum is over all possible distributions PX (x) of X . Moreover, as shown
in [68], I(S ;Y )− I(S ;Z ) is a convex function of PX (x) where the main channel is less
noisy than the wire tap channel; hence, the secrecy capacity can be calculated using
convex optimization methods. It was further shown in [68] that if I(S ;Y ) and I(S ;Z )
are individually maximized by the same PX (x), and the main channel (X → Y) is less
noisy than the wiretap channel (X→ Z), then
Cs = Capacity(X→ Y)− Capacity(X→ Z) (2.7)
where Capacity(·) refers to the usual channel capacity. The capacity of a symmetric
channel is given by
Cs = H(X )−H(X |Y ) (2.8)
where the random variable X at the input to the channel is uniform distribution and Y is
the corresponding random variable at the channel output. When the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel are symmetric and the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded
with respect to the main channel, a simple expression for Cs was given by [67]:
Cs = H(X |Z )−H(X |Y ) (2.9)
An important example of a symmetric channel is the BSC channel. Let a BSC channel
with crossover probability p be denoted by BSC(p). If the main channel is BSC(p1) while
13
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the eavesdropper’s channel is BSC(p2), then the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs =
 h(p2)− h(p1), p2 > p10, otherwise (2.10)
where h denotes the binary entropy function defined by
h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p)
2.4 Proposed Unconditional Security Model
In this section, we present the proposed unconditional security model in detail, where
two steps are given for realizing unconditionally security communication, the first step is
to build up a practical wiretap channel and the second step is to extend the advantages
to achieve the unconditional secure communication by a security code scheme.
The unconditionally secure communications model targeted in this thesis is shown in
Figure 2.3, where Alice sends m bits message S = {s1, s2, · · · , sm} to Bob. Firstly, Alice
encodes the message such that
X = χ1(S) (2.11)
where χ1 is the security encoder function. Alice continues to encode X such that.
C = χ2(X) (2.12)
where χ2 is the channel encoder function. The channel coding step is optional. Then
Alice and Bob perform the feedback as defined in next section. After several rounds
two-way communication between Alice and Bob, the sequence V received by Bob is the
noisy version of sequence C. Meanwhile, Eve can also observe the noisy sequence Ve.
Bob and Eve perform channel decoding as:
Y = ψ2(V) (2.13)
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Z = ψ2(Ve) (2.14)
where ψ2 is channel decoding function, which is an invertible function of the channel
encoding function χ2. Then security decoding is performed as following:
S˜ = ψ1(Y) (2.15)
S˜e = ψ1(Z) (2.16)
where ψ1 is security decoding function, which is an invertible function of security encod-
ing function χ1. In Eqs. (2.15) and (2.16), the eavesdropper uses the same decoding
function ψ1 as that of the legitimate. The decoding function ψ1 that the legitimate used
is the optimal receiving method. Therefore, if the eavesdropper want to get the optimal
receiving result, he has to take this decoding function ψ1 as his receiver. By security
decoding, Bob gets the message estimation S˜ with error probability Pr(S˜ 6= S)→ 0 and
Eve gets the message estimation S˜e with error probability Pr(S˜e 6= S)→ 0.5 at the same
time. Therefore, the security of Alice’s message S is guaranteed.
Figure 2.3: The unconditional communication model
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MRTWC Method for Building
Wiretap Channels
Wyner [9, 10] proved that the transmitter could send information to the legitimate re-
ceiver in virtually perfect secrecy without sharing a secret key with the legitimate receiver
if the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the main channel. However, the as-
sumption that the adversary only receives a degraded signal from the legitimate receiver
is generally unrealistic. Wyner also did not mention how to build such advantages for the
legitimate partners. This became a major problem in taking advantage of the advances
in the wiretap channel model theory.
Most results focused on the MIMO approaches to build the advanced channel [36]-
[49]. However, in some scenarios such as Device-to-Device (D2D) communication system
[50]-[54], it is hard to support the multiple antennas. Maurer [55] is the first person
to present a method to build an advantages for the legitimate partners without MIMO
scheme. Maurer only presented one round feedback in his paper [55] under BSC channel,
which has a drawback that the advantage of the main channel is less when the channel
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noise is small. In this chapter, we develop this method to Multiple Rounds Two-Way
Communication (MRTWC) method for building a wiretap channel in detail to enhance
the advantage of the main channel. We also present the BER analysis for both one round
feedback and novel MRTWC method under AWGN and Rayleigh channel.
3.1 Two-way Communication for Building Wire-tap
Channel
[55] introduced two-way communications scheme, in which feedback signals from the
destination play the role of private keys that initiate secure communications. An example
is shown as follows.
Alice intends to send a sequence S = {s0, s1, · · · , sn−1} to Bob. To initiate a se-
cure communication, firstly Bob sends a random sequence Q = {q0, q1, · · · , qn−1} to
Alice, i.e. Pr(qi = 0) = Pr(qi = 1) = 0.5 . Let E = {e0, e1, · · · , en−1} and Ee =
{ee 0, ee 1, · · · , ee n−1} denote the error vectors of the Alice’s and the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel, respectively. The received signals of Alice and the eavesdropper are
T = E+Q (3.1a)
and
Te = Ee +Q (3.1b)
respectively, where T = {t0, t1, · · · , tn−1}, ti = qi ⊕ ei and Te = {te0 , te1 , · · · , ten−1}, tei =
qi ⊕ eei . Then Alice uses the received signal T to calculate
U = T+ S (3.2)
where U = {u0, u1, · · · , un−1}, ui = ti ⊕mi. Alice encodes U such that
W = φ(U) (3.3)
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where φ is the encoder function. Alice sends W over the channel. Bob and the eaves-
dropper receive the noise version of W as W′ and decode W′ as
Uˆ = ψ(W′) (3.4)
where ψ is the decoder function. We assume the decoding error probability Pr(Uˆ 6=
U) → 0. Bob and the eavesdropper received U with almost error free. Bob knows the
random sequence Q , so he can add wise Q to U as
Y = U⊕Q = S⊕E (3.5)
where Y = {y0, y1, · · · , yn−1}. The eavesdropper only knows Te that is the noise version
of Q and he only can add wise Eq. (3.1b) to U as:
Z = U⊕Te = S⊕E⊕Ee (3.6)
where Z = {z0, z1, · · · , zn−1}. By comparing Eq. (3.5) with Eq. (3.6), Ee becomes extra
noise. Therefore, after the two-way communication in Figure 3.1, the direction of the
main channel is inverted when the eavesdropper has a better channel at the beginning.
Figure 3.1: Two way communication
Lemma 3.1: Let the error probability of E = {e0, e1, · · · , ei, · · · , en−1} in (3.1a) be
Pr(ei = 1) = α and the error probability of Ee = {ee 0, ee 1, · · · , ee i, · · · , ee n−1} in (3.1b)
18
Chapter 3. MRTWC Method for Building Wiretap Channels
be Pr(ee i = 1) = β. After a round-trip two-way communication, the error probability
of the main channel is α, and the error probability of the eavesdropper’s channel is β,
α + β − 2αβ.
Proof : Since
Pr(yi 6= si) = Pr(ei = 1) = α,
and
Pr(zi 6= si) = Pr(ei = 1) · Pr(eei = 0) + Pr(ei = 0) · Pr(eei = 1)
= α · (1− β) + (1− α) · β
Thus Pr(zi 6= si) = α + β − 2αβ.
Because α ≤ 0.5 and β ≤ 0.5, so we have α ≤ α + β − 2αβ, the equality holds for
α = 0.5 or β = 0.
According to the secret capacity Cs in (2.10), we know that the secrecy capacity Cs is
very small when β is very small. The secret level of the system is very weak. it is clear that
after a round-trip two-way communication, only the main channel quality is improved
while the attacker’s channel will still be as noisy as it was. Thus, there could be a
method for changing the situation by continuing performing the two-way communication
or parallel channel feedbacks round by round, where the advantage of the main channel
will be increased accordingly. A wiretap channel can thus be built when the legitimate
user’s channel is better than that of the attacker by some extent. Based on the above
observations, this thesis will present multiple rounds two-way communication for building
the wiretap channel in the following section.
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3.2 MRTWC Method for Building Wire-tap Chan-
nel
Following Maurer’s two-way communication method [55] , this section proposed a multi-
ple rounds two-way communication to extend the advantages of the legitimate partners.
Obviously, we can not repeat the one round feedback again and again. Otherwise, the
Eves can attack every one round feedback separately and the advantage of the main
channel is not enhanced. As shown in Figure 3.2, our contribution is to put a channel
coding on the top of the information and split the encoded sequence into multi streams
randomly and let such random streams to perform the one way feedback in Figure 3.1.
Eve can not get any useful information by attacking any stream. Instead, he has to add
all the streams together and recovers the information from the added stream while the
extra noise is accumulated, which degraded the Eve’s channel.
Figure 3.2: Encoded stream is split into multi streams
Alice wants to transmit m1 bits message X to Bob, she selects a (n1,m1) linear binary
code C = (c0, c1, · · · , cn1−1) such that
C = χ(X) (3.7)
where χ is the channel encoder function. Then Alice randomly chooses C0,C1, · · · ,Cδ−2
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, where Ci = (c
0
i , c
1
i , · · · , cn1−1i ), 0 ≤ i < δ− 2 and δ is interactive communication rounds
which determined by the channel noisy level [83]. The vector Cδ−1 can be calculated
from encoded vector C in (3.7):
Cδ−1 = C0 ⊕C1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Cδ−2 ⊕C (3.8)
Following Eq. (3.8), Bob randomly generates δ sequences Qi = (q
0
i , q
1
i , · · · , qn1−1i ),
i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1. The scheme may take two steps to complete the information
exchange:
1)Bob → Alice : Qi = (q0i , q1i , · · · , qn1−1i ), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1. The received signals
of Alice and the eavesdropper are Ti = Qi ⊕ Ei and Te i = Qi ⊕ Ee i, respectively,
where Ei = (e
0
i , e
1
i , · · · , en1−1i ) and Ee i = (e0e i, e1e i, · · · , en1−1e i ) denote the error vectors
of the Alice’s and the eavesdropper’s channel correspond to the transmitted the random
sequence Qi, respectively.
2)Alice → Bob : Ui = Ci ⊕ Ti, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1. Alice send Ui to Bob by the
error free channel which can be obtained by using a powerful error correcting code. After
Bob receives Ui, he will use δ random sequences Qi to calculate as
Vi = Ui ⊕Qi = Ci ⊕Ti ⊕Qi = Ci ⊕Ei (3.9)
He sums the Vi, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1 as
V =
δ−1∑
i=0
Vi =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ei (3.10)
According to (3.8), we have:
V = C⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ei (3.11)
At the same time, Eve intercept Ui. Instead of known the random sequence Qi, Eve only
knows Te i. Therefore, Eve calculates as
Ve i = Ui ⊕Te i = Ci ⊕Ei ⊕Ee i (3.12)
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Eve also can sum the Ve i, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1 as
Ve =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ve i =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ei ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ee i (3.13)
Ve = C⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ei ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
Ee i (3.14)
Finally, Bob perform channel decoding as:
C˜ = ψ(V) (3.15)
where ψ is the decoding function, which is an invertible function of χ. At the same time,
Eve also can perform channel decoding as:
C˜e = ψ(Ve) (3.16)
Because of extra noise term
∑δ−1
i=0 Ee i in (3.14), we have:
Pr(C˜ 6= C) < Pr(C˜e 6= C) (3.17)
As a result, the adversary’s channel is noisier than the one taken by the legitimate partner
with sufficient rounds of such two-way communications. This scheme is shown in Figure
3.3.
3.3 BER and LLR Extraction of the MRTWC under
Different Channels
The method of MRTWC provides a novel approach of creating wiretap channels, but the
channel BER needs to be specifically quantified according to the crossover probability in
the case of BSC, or the SNR in the case of AWGN and Rayleigh channels, before it can
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Figure 3.3: The MRTWC method employed in the study for creating wiretap channel.
be projected to the security and reliability conditions in (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. It
is also necessary to derive the exact representation of bit Log-likelihood Ratios (LLR) for
optimal soft information decoding and demodulation. Therefore, this section provides
the BER extraction of the BSC, AWGN, and Rayleigh channels and LLR extraction
under the MRTWC method.
3.3.1 BER over BSC
Let the error probability of Ei = (e
0
i , e
1
i , · · · , en−1i ) in (3.10) be denoted as Pr(eji = 1) =
αi, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1, and the error probability of Ee i = (e0e i, e1e i, · · · , en−1e i ) in (3.13)
be denoted as Pr(eje i = 1) = βi, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ−1, which means that αi and βi are the
crossover probabilities of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively.
By considering single round (i.e., δ = 1). The error probability of V = (v0, v1, · · · , vn−1)
in (3.10) and Ve = (ve 0, ve 1, · · · , ve n−1) in (3.13) are:
Pr(vj 6= cj) = Pr(ej0 = 1) = α0
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Pr(ve j 6= cj) = Pr(ej0 = 1) · Pr(eje 0 = 0) + Pr(ej0 = 0) · Pr(eje 0 = 1)
= α0 · (1− β0) + β0 · (1− α0) = α0 + β0 − 2α0β0
(3.18)
Let αji and β
j
i be jth received signal’s error probabilities of the main channel and
the eavesdropper channel under ith round communication, respectively. With (3.18), we
can get the general case of the multiple rounds of two-way communication as following
theory.
Lemma 3.2: After δ round-trip two-way communication, the bit-error rates (BERs)
of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are 1 − 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
and 1 −
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
, respectively.
Proof: Following from (3.11), we have that Bobs BER ε1j is
ε1j = Pr(vj 6= cj) = Pr
(
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji = 1
)
= 1− Pr
(
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji = 0
)
. (3.19)
Since the probability that an even number of digits in {ej0, ej1, · · · , ejδ−1} are “1” is
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
[69], thus (3.19) can be rewritten as
ε1j = 1−
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
, (3.20)
where αji = Pr(e
j
i = 1).
Similarly, according to (3.14), we get that the BER ε2j for Eve is
ε2j = Pr(ve j 6= cj) = Pr
(
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 1
)
= 1− Pr(ve j = cj) = Pr
(
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 0
)
.
(3.21)
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The probability that an even number of digits in {ej0, ej1, · · · , ejδ−1, eje 0, eje 1, · · · , eje (δ−1)}
are “1” is [69]
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2βji )
)
=
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
, (3.22)
then (3.21) can be modified as
ε2j = Pr(ve j 6= cj) = 1−
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
, (3.23)
where βji = Pr(e
j
e i = 1).
Hence, we obtain the statement of the theorem; Q.E.D.
(3.20) and (3.23) derived in Lemma 3.2 are essentially the same as (12a) and (12b) in
[65], respectively. The only difference is in representation. Let δ = 1, we have that the
BERs of Bob and Eve are
ε1 = 1− 1
2
(1 + (1− 2α))
ε2 = 1− 1
2
(1 + (1− 2α)(1− 2β)) = α + β − 2αβ
 (3.24)
In (3.24), we obtain lemma 1 in [65].
According to (3.24), we can conclude that the BER of Bob after interaction is no
more than that of Eve.
Lemma 3.3: After δ round-trip two-way communication, we can prove two state-
ments about the relationship between ε1 and ε2.
Statements:
1) ε1 is no more than ε2, i.e., ε1 ≤ ε2;
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2) The equality in 1) holds for α = 0.5, 0 ≤ j ≤ δ − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n or
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 0.
Proof: To prove the first statement, we note that
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji ) ≥
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji ),
then
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
≥ 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
.
So that
1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
≤ 1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
.
Hence we obtain ε1 ≤ ε2.
To prove the second statement, let ε1 = ε2, we get
1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )
)
= 1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
. (3.25)
From (3.25), we can obtain that ε1 = ε2 = 0.5. if αji = 0.5, 0 ≤ j ≤ δ − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Following from (3.19) and (3.21), we can obtain the fact that if
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 0, the
equality in
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji =
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eji ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i (3.26)
holds. Then we conclude that ε1 = ε2 on condition of
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 0.
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Hence, we obtain the statement of the theorem; Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.4: For given {αji , βji |αji = 0.5, 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, the prob-
ability that the BER of the legitimate receiver equals to that of the eavesdropper is
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2βji )
)
.
Proof: Following from Lemma 3.3, we have that
Pr(ε
1
j = ε
2
j) = Pr
(
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕eje i = 0
)
. (3.27)
Note that the probability that an even number of digits are “1” is
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2βji )
)
, (3.28)
then
Pr(ε
1
j = ε
2
j) =
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2βji )
)
. (3.29)
Hence, we obtain the statement of the theorem; Q.E.D.
3.3.2 LLRs Extraction over BSC
The soft decoding algorithm is the optimum decoding method. For permitting the secu-
rity, Bob should know the decoding performance under the optimum decoding method.
However, LLRs of the received signals are necessary for performing the soft decoding
algorithms. In this section, we give the method of the LLRs extraction of the received
signals as following.
Lemma 3.5: After δ round-trip two-way communication, the LLR for cj of the
legitimate receiver is
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llr(vj) =
 ln
ε1j
1−ε1j
, if vj = 0
ln
1−ε1j
ε1j
, if vj = 1
, (3.30)
and that for the eavesdropper is
llr(ve j) =
 ln
ε2j
1−ε2j
, if ve j = 0
ln
1−ε2j
ε2j
, if ve j = 1
. (3.31)
Proof: As for Bob, the LLR of cj is give by [70]
llr(vj) = ln
Pr(cj = 1|vj)
Pr(cj = 0|vj) . (3.32)
According to Lemma 3.3, if vj = 0, (3.32) can be modified as
llr(vj)=ln
Pr(cj = 1|vj)
Pr(cj = 0|vj) =ln
Pr(vj 6= cj)
Pr(vj = cj)
=ln
1− 1
2
(
1+
δ−1∏
i=0
(1−2αji )
)
1
2
(
1+
δ−1∏
i=0
(1−2αji )
) =ln ε1j
1−ε1j
. (3.33)
If vj = 1, (3.32) is now rewritten as
llr(vj)=ln
Pr(cj =1|vj)
Pr(vj =0|vj) =ln
Pr(vj =cj)
Pr(vj 6=cj) =ln
1
2
(
1+
δ−1∏
i=0
(1−2αji )
)
1− 1
2
(
1+
δ−1∏
i=0
(1−2αji )
)=ln 1−ε1j
ε1j
. (3.34)
Similarly, the LLRs for ce j of Eve is
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llr(ve j) = ln
Pr(cj = 1|ve j)
Pr(ci = 0|ve j) = ln
Pr(ve j 6= cj)
Pr(ve j = cj)
= ln
1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
) = ln ε2j
1− ε2j
.
(3.35)
and
llr(ve j) = ln
Pr(cj = 1|ve j)
Pr(cj = 0|ve j) = ln
Pr(ve j = cj)
Pr(ve j 6= cj)
= ln
1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
)
1− 1
2
(
1 +
δ−1∏
i=0
(1− 2αji )(1− 2βji )
) = ln 1− ε2j
ε2j
.
(3.36)
for ve j = 0 and ve j = 1, respectively.
Hence, we obtain the statement of the theorem; Q.E.D.
Based on the above description, the process for building wiretap channel via multiple
round two-way communication under the BSC is depicted in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Detailed process for building wiretap channel on the feedback
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Algorithm 1 Building Wiretap Channel on the Feedback
1: Randomly generate m-bit secret messages S ;Set multiple round parameter δ
2: Compute C with (3.7)
3: for i from 0 to δ − 2 do
4: Randomly generate binary sequence C i
5: end for
6: Compute C δ−1 with (3.8)
7: for i from 0 to δ − 1 do
8: Bob randomly generates binary sequence Q i and sends to the wireless channel
9: Alice and Eve receive the noisy version of Q i as T i
10: Alice calculates Ui as Ui = Ci+Ti and send Ui to the ”error free” wireless channel
11: Bob and Eve receive Ui and get Vi and Ve i according to (3.9) and (3.12), respec-
tively
12: end for
13: for j from 0 to n− 1 do
14: Compute llr(vj) according to (3.33) or (3.34)
15: Compute llr(ve j) according to (3.35) or (3.36)
16: end for
17: The legitimate receiver computes C˜ by soft decoding with {llr(v1), · · · , llr(vn)}
18: The Eve computes C˜e by the soft decoding with {llr(ve 1), · · · , llr(ve n)}
19: The legitimate receiver and Eve recover the secret messages
3.3.3 BER over AWGN
Under an AWGN channel, the attack model considered in this thesis is that the wiretapper
can demodulate every intercepted transmission and process the obtained information,
which is the most aggressive attack that the wiretapper can possibly launch. Without
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loss of generality, we consider that the transmissions are modulated under Binary Phase
Shift Keying (BPSK), and our target is to map the SNR under AWGN to BER. The same
approach can be applied to any other modulation scheme. The BER of BPSK signals on
AWGN channels with coherent detection, denoted as pb(e), is given by [94]:
Pb(e) = Q(
√
2Es
N0
) (3.37)
where Es is the transmitted energy per bit, N0 = 2σ
2 is the noise power spectral density
and Q(·) function is defined as:
Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2/2dt, x ≥ 0
Let γ denote the average SNR. (3.37) can also be written as
Pb(e) = Q(
√
γ) (3.38)
The BER of AWGN channels with other modulation methods can refer [94].
The model of MRTWC over the AWGN channel is shown in Figure 3.4, which is
extended from the model in Figure 3.3. We have:
Ti = Qi +Ni (3.39)
Te i = Qi +Ne i (3.40)
where i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ − 1. The ith signal received by Bob and Eve is:
Vi = Ci +Ti +Qi = Ci +Qi +Ni +Qi = Ci +Ni (3.41)
and
Ve i = Ci +Ti +Te i +Qi
= Ci +Qi +Ni +Qi +Ne i = Ci +Ni +Ne i
(3.42)
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where Ni and Ne i are independent AWGN samples with zero mean, and variances σ
2
i
and σ2e i , respectively. Bob and Eve sum Vi and Ve i as:
V =
δ−1∑
i=0
Vi =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ni (3.43)
Ve =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ve i =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ni +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ne i (3.44)
We assumed that the random sequence Qi is transmitted with equal power. Let the
average transmitted power of ith random sequence Qi be denoted as Pi and the ith noise
power of receive branch be denoted as σ2i . The average SNR of Ti in (3.39) is equal
to the ratio of the transmitted power and the noise power per receiver. Thus it can be
written as:
γi =
Pi
σ2i
(3.45)
The SNR of Te i in (3.40) can be written as:
γe i =
Pi
σ2e i
(3.46)
By construction the model of MRTWC over AWGN channels in Figure 3.3, the bit error
probabilities for both the main channel and the Eves channel are mapped from the
SNR under AWGN. Then the same calculation steps can be taken from subsection 3.3.1.
With(3.38), we have the bit error probabilities of Ti and Te i as Pr(Ti) = Q(γi) = αA i
and Pr(Te i) = Q(γe i) = βA i , respectively. Then we have the bit error probabilities of
Vi and Ve i as:
Pr(Vi) = αA i (3.47)
Pr(Ve i) = αA i + βA i − 2αa iβa i (3.48)
The BER of V in (3.43) and Ve in (3.44) can be calculated according (3.19) to (3.21)
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Figure 3.4: The model of MRTWC over AWGN Channels
3.3.4 LLRs Extraction over AWGN
After a round-trip two-way communication, let C = (c0, c1, · · · , cj, · · · , cn−1) be the
information that Alice sends to Bob, Q = {q0, q1, · · · , qn−1} be a random sequence that
Bob sends to Alice , and V = (v0, v1, · · · , vj, · · · , vn−1) and V˜ = (v˜0, v˜1, · · · , v˜j, · · · , v˜n−1)
be the Bob’s received sequence after interaction and decoded sequence, respectively.
We have:
vj = (2cj − 1) + (2qj − 1) + nj, nj ∼ CN(0, σ21) (3.49)
v˜j = vj − (2qj − 1) = 2cj − 1 + nj. (3.50)
Similarly, we denote Eves received sequence after interaction asVe = (ve 0, ve 1, · · · , ve j, · · · , ve (n−1))
and V˜e = (v˜e 0, v˜e 1, · · · , v˜e j, · · · , v˜e (n−1)) as the sequence for Eves decoding, and then
we can have
v˜e j = ve j − (2qj − 1 + ne j) = 2cj − 1 + nj − ne j, (3.51)
where ne j ∼ CN(0, σ22).
Lemma 3.6: After a round-trip two-way communication, the bit LLR derived from
vj is 2vj/σ
2
1, and that derived from ve j is 2ve j/(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2).
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Proof: Following from (3.50), we get that the bit LLR derived from vj is 2vj/σ
2
1 [70].
Note that (nj−ne j) ∼ CN(0, σ21 +σ22), then the LLR derived from ve j is 2ve j/(σ21 +σ22)
following from (3.51) [70].
Hence, the statement of the theorem is achieved; Q.E.D.
From lemma 3.6, we conclude that if the two feedback channel conditions are the
same, i.e., σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2, the LLRs derived from vj and ve j are 2vj/σ
2 and ve j/σ
2,
respectively. Moreover, if the feedback channel between Bob and Eve is error-free, the
BERs of Bob and Eve will be the same after interaction. Otherwise, the Bobs BER is
smaller than Eves.
Let C = (C0,C1, · · · ,Ci, · · · ,C(δ−1)) be n-dimensional encoded vectors that Alice
aims to send to Bob in (3.8) and Q = (Q0,Q1, · · · ,Qi, · · · ,Q(δ−1)) be n-dimensional
vectors that Bob randomly generates and sends to Alice, where ith vector can be de-
noted as C i = (c
0
i , c
1
i , · · · , cji , · · · , cn−1i ) and Q i = (q0i , q1i , · · · , qji , · · · , qn−1i )). With-
in δ round-trip two-way communication, the received δ n-dimensional vectors V =
(V0,V1, · · · ,Vi, · · · ,V(δ−1)) of Bob after interaction and ith vector can be denoted as
V i = (v
0
i , v
1
i , · · · , vji , · · · , vn−1i ), 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 (3.52)
where
vji = (2c
j
i − 1) + (2qji − 1) + nji , nji ∼ CN(0, σ21). (3.53)
Thus, the n-dimensional decoded vectors of Bob are V˜ = (V˜0, V˜1, · · · , V˜i, · · · , V˜(δ−1))
and ith vector can be given by
V˜ i = (v˜
0
i , v˜
1
i , · · · , v˜ji , · · · , v˜n−1i ) (3.54)
where
v˜ji = (2c
j
i − 1) + nji . (3.55)
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In a similar way, we denote the δ n-dimensional vectorsVe = (Ve 0,Ve 1, · · · ,Ve i, · · · ,Ve (δ−1))
of Bob after interaction and ith vector can be denoted as
V e i = (v
0
e i, v
1
e i, · · · , vje i, · · · , vn−1e i ), 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 (3.56)
where vje i = (2c
j
i − 1) + (2qji − 1) + nji . Then, the n-dimensional decoded vectors of Eve
are V˜e = (V˜e 0, V˜e 1, · · · , V˜e i, · · · , V˜e (δ−1)) and ith vector can be given by
V˜ e i = (v˜
0
e i, v˜
1
e i, · · · , v˜je i, · · · , v˜n−1e i ) (3.57)
Then, we can have v˜je i = (2c
j
i − 1) + nji − nje i.
Lemma 3.7: After δ round-trip two-way communication, the LLR of bit cj for the
legitimate receivers decoding can be given by
2arc tanh
(
δ−1∏
i=0
tanh
(
vji
σ21
))
and that for the eavesdropper can be written as
2arc tanh
(
δ−1∏
i=0
tanh
(
vje i
σ21 + σ
2
2
))
.
Proof: From (3.8), we note C =
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕C i, and then we get ci ⊕
δ−1∑
i=0
⊕cji = 0. That
is to say, (c0i , c
1
i , c
2
i , · · · , cδ−1i , ci) is a codeword of the binary (δ, δ − 1) single-parity-check
(SPC) code [70, 72, 73].
From (3.54), we note that the ith column of V˜ i is exactly the corresponding channel
receive vector of (c0i , c
1
i , c
2
i , · · · , cn−1i ), 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1 for Bob. Then, the LLR of bit cji is
[70, 72]
2arc tanh
(
δ−1∏
i=0
tanh
(
v˜ji
σ21
))
, (3.58)
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where arc tanhx is the inverse function of tanhx defined as
tanhx =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
Similarly, we observe that the column of V˜ e i is the corresponding channel receive
vector of (c0i , c
1
i , c
2
i , · · · , cn−1i ), 0 ≤ i ≤ δ − 1 for Eve following from (3.57). Therefore,
the LLR of bit cji is [70, 72]
2arc tanh
(
δ−1∏
i=0
tanh
(
v˜je i
σ21 + σ
2
2
))
. (3.59)
Hence, the statement of the theorem is achieved; Q.E.D.
3.3.5 BER over Rayleigh Channel
Similar to the case of the AWGN, we consider the model of MRTWC over Rayleigh
channels as shown in Figure 3.5. We have:
Pr(Ti) = λiQi +Ni (3.60)
Pr(Te i) = λe iQi +Ne i (3.61)
where i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , δ−1 ; λi is the fading coefficient magnitude between Bob and Alice,
and λe i is the fading coefficient magnitude between Bob and Eve. The corresponding
ith signal received by Bob and Eve, respectively, can be expressed as:
Vi = Ci +Ti +Qi = Ci + λiQi +Ni +Qi (3.62)
and
Ve i = Ci +Ti +Te i = Ci + λiQi +Ni + λe iQi +Ne i (3.63)
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where Ni and Ne i are the AWGN sample with zero mean and variances denoted as σ
2
i
and σ2e i , respectively. Bob and Eve sum Vi and Ve i as:
V =
δ−1∑
i=0
Vi =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci +
δ−1∑
i=0
(λi + 1)Qi +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ni (3.64)
Ve =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ve i =
δ−1∑
i=0
Ci +
δ−1∑
i=0
(λi + λe i)Qi +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ni +
δ−1∑
i=0
Ne i (3.65)
For a given fading attenuation coefficient λ , the average SNR per bit is defined as:
γ¯ = E(λ2)
Es
N0
(3.66)
where E(·) denotes the expectation operation. For a Rayleigh fading channel, the average
Figure 3.5: The model of MRTWC over Rayleigh Channels
BER of BPSK signals is given by [94]
Pb(e) =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯
1 + γ¯
)
(3.67)
Let γ¯i and γ¯e i be the SNR of Ti in (3.60) and Te i in (3.61), respectively. We have
the BER of Ti and Te i as:
Pr(Ti) =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯i
1 + γ¯i
)
= αR i
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Pr(Te i) =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯e i
1 + γ¯e i
)
= βR i
Thus, the BER of Vi and Ve i can be written as:
Pr(Vi) = αR i (3.68)
Pr(Ve i) = αR i + βR i − 2αR iβR i (3.69)
The BER of V in (3.64) and Ve in (3.65) can be calculated according (3.19) to (3.21)
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A Novel Security Code Construction
To achieve the unconditional security system in Figure 2.3, a security encoding and
decoding function (i.e., χ1 and ψ1) with short code lengths, low complexity, and high
achievable security capacity should be in place for wireless applications. For this purpose,
the thesis constructs a novel big family of security codes with good properties from both
binary and non-binary resilient functions in this chapter.
4.1 Coset Security Codes
Wyner [9] firstly introduced the coset code based on a random construction to solve the
particular case when the main channel is noiseless and the wiretap channel is noisy BSC
channel. It was significantly extended and generalized in [71, 31]. However, no effective
encoding and decoding algorithm was developed, such that the coset coding scheme can
hardly be practically used. But the coset code are still the basis to construct the other
good security codes. Here we present its construction as following.
To transmit k bits message Sj = {sj1, sj2, · · · , sjk}, j = 1, 2, · · · , 2k, a (n, n − k) linear
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Table 4.1: Coset code
Ce1 Ce2 · · · Cei · · · Ce2(n−k)
S1 → V1 w1 w1 ⊕Ce1 w1 ⊕Ce2 · · · w1 ⊕Cei · · · w1 ⊕Ce2(n−k)
S2 → V2 w2 w2 ⊕Ce1 w2 ⊕Ce2 · · · w2 ⊕Cei · · · w2 ⊕Ce2(n−k)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
Sj → Vj wj wj ⊕Ce1 wj ⊕Ce2 · · · wj ⊕Cei · · · wj ⊕Ce2(n−k)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
S2
k → V2k w2k w2k ⊕Ce1 w2k ⊕Ce2 · · · w2k ⊕Cei · · · w2k ⊕Ce2(n−k)
binary code Ce with coset V = {V1,V2, · · · ,V2k} is chosen. Let each message Mj
correspond to a coset Vj = {Vj1,Vj2, · · · ,Vj2n−k}, where n-tuple Vji such that
Vji = w
j ⊕Cei, i = 2n−k, j = 2k, (4.1)
wj and Cei ∈ {0, 1}n, Cei is codeword of (n, n−k) linear binary code. We construct the
encoder such that the encoder output Vji ∈ {0, 1}n is a randomly chosen member of the
coset when the sending message is Sj. Therefore, message Sj and wj corresponding the
syndrome and error vector of the code Ce, respectively. This scheme can refer as Table
4.1.
Clearly, the decoder of the legitimate receiver can recover Sj from output Vji perfectly
if the legitimate communication partners hold an error free channel. Now we turn to
eavesdroppers who observe the noisy version Zej ∈ {0, 1}n, which is the output of the
BSC corresponding to the input Vji . Let S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk}, Sˆ = {sˆ1, sˆ2, · · · , sˆk} and
Sˆe = {sˆe1 , sˆe2 , · · · , sˆek} be vectors denoting Alice’s message, Bob’s decoded message and
Eve’s decoded message, respectively. We can state the security criterion to guarantee
security of Alice’s message Sj as following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: The average BER of the recovering message Sj from Zej equals to 0.5,
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i.e., Pr(sji 6= sˆjei) = 0.5, when the received noisy version Zej has the equal probability to
fall into one of cosets V, i.e., Pr(Zej ∈ Vj) = 2−k, for j = 1, 2, · · · , 2k.
The proof of this lemma can refer [83].
following the Wyner’s coset security codes, there are some researched results about the
novel security codes construction. [32] presented security codes derived from polar codes,
which asymptotically achieve the whole capacity equivocation region for the wiretap
channel. [61] presented a channel-state-aware security code construction for achieving
the secrecy capacity under a wide range of wiretap channels. By using polar codes,
[32, 61] yield a code length of 220 bits, which is not practical in wireless communications.
[33, 34] is the only study on a practical solution via LDPC codes to asymptotically achieve
the whole capacity equivocation region for the wiretap channel. But it is on the Binary
Erasure Channel (BEC) instead the BSC, which is not considered a reasonable channel
model. Note that the bound provided by [33] is the best result among all the reported
ones for the short security codes under BSC channel. All these security codes construction
are based on the coset codes construction. [79] provided the connection between security
codes and binary resilient functions. But it did not provide an effective encoding method
for the developed security codes. Apparently, how to construct the security code close
to security capacity under BSC while being practically low-complexity implementable,
is still an open problem. However, also these results can be catalogued into the coset
security codes.
In this research, it is the first time to explore developing the low-complexity encoding
and decoding short-length security coding scheme via the resilient fanction for wireless
communication applications.
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4.2 Binary Security Code Construction from Resilien-
t Functions
4.2.1 Binary Resilient Functions
Resilient functions were firstly introduced and studied in [58, 59, 60], and were originally
applied respectively to the key distribution and generation of random strings in presence
of faulty processors. The definition of binary resilient functions is as follows.
Definition 4.1 [58]: Let n ≥ m ≥ 1 be integers and suppose:
f : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m (4.2)
where f is a function that accepts n input bits and produces m output bits. Let t ≤ n
be an integer. Suppose (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, where t arbitrary input bits out of n
are fixed by an adversary, and the remaining n − t input bits are chosen independently
at random. Then f is said to be t-resilient by which an output of every possible m-tuple
is equally likely to occur. Formally, the property can be stated as follows: Suppose
f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) and let (z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∈ {0, 1}n be an accepted input
by an adversary. For every t-subset (i1, i2, · · · , it) ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} , we have:
Pr(f(z1, z2, · · · , zn) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)|xij = zil) =
1
2m
(4.3)
where 0 ≤ j, l ≤ t. Such a function f is called as a binary (n,m, t) resilient function.
Theorem 4.1: Let us consider the model in Figure 4.1. Let n-tupleX = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)
pass a BSC channel and Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) is a noisy version of X. Let f be an (n,m, t)
resilient function, and set (s1, s2, · · · , sm) = f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) and (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) =
f(z1, z2, · · · , zn). Let the channel crossover probability be p , i.e. Pr(xi 6= zi) = p.
If:
p ≥ (n− t)
2n
(4.4)
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then we have:
Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)) = 1
2m
(4.5)
Proof : Let us firstly consider n-tuple X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn).
If Z takes exact arbitray t bits from X, it is obviously that there are randomly and
independently t bits correctly taken in Z, and a half of the remaining n− t bits as correct
and the other half as incorrect. Therefore, the total correct bits in Z are 1
2
(n+ t) and the
total error bits in Z are 1
2
(n− t), which leads to Pr(xi 6= zi) = n−t2n . If Pr(xi 6= zi) ≥ n−t2n ,
it means no more than t bits in Z are correctly taken from X. From Definition 4.1
the output (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) recovered from Z is uniform distribution over m-tuple vector
space. Thus (4.4) and (4.5) hold immediately.
Figure 4.1: BSC channel with crossover probability p
Lemma 4.2: Let (s1, s2, · · · , sm) in Theorem 4.1 be uniformly distributed over am
m-tuple vector space. When Eqs (4.4) or (4.5) hold on, the average BER of recovering
message (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) from Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) is approaches to 0.5 with n→∞, i.e.,
Pr(s˜i 6= si) = 0.5.
Proof : Because (s1, s2, · · · , sm) is uniformly distributed over an m-tuple vector space,
let Sj = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m represent a distinct binary sequence of length m.
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Then the average BER of the recovering message (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) is:
Pr(s˜i 6= si|Z) = Average ] of erroneous bits
m
=
2m∑
j=1
Pr(Sj)
1
m
∑
k 6=j
Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) = Sk)d(Sj,Sk)
=
1
m
∑
k 6=j
Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) = Sk)d(Sj,Sk)
Form Eq (4.5), we have Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) = Sk) = 12m . Then we can get:
Pr(s˜i 6= si | Z) = 1
2m
· 1
m
∑
k 6=j
d(Sj,Sk) (4.6)
where d(Sj,Sk) is the Hamming distance between Sj and Sk . Let Aa denotes the number
of m dimension vectors which have distance a with vector(s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m), we have:∑
k 6=j
d(Sj,Sk) =
m∑
a=1
(Aa · a) =
m∑
a=1
(
 m
a
 · a) = m∑
a=1
(
m!
a!(m− a)! · a) (4.7)
From the mean of the binomial distribution, we have:
m∑
a=1
(
m!
a!(m− a)! · a · p
a · (1− p)(m−a)) = mp
Let p = 1
2
, we have:
m∑
a=1
(
m!
a!(m− a)! · a · (
1
2
)m) = m · 1
2
=⇒ (1
2
)m ·
m∑
a=1
(
m!
a!(m− a)! · a) = m ·
1
2
=⇒
m∑
a=1
(
m!
a!(m− a)! · a) = m · 2
m−1
(4.8)
(4.7) becomes: ∑
k 6=j
d(Sj,Sk) = m · 2m−1
Therefore, (4.6) becomes:
Pr(s˜i 6= si | Z) = 1
2m
· 1
m
·m · 2m−1 = 1
2
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4.2.2 Security Code Construction
[79] provided an example of security codes from resilient functions by assuming that the
encoding function can be obtained via the inverse of decoding functions. However in
most cases, it is not tractable to find the inverse of decoding functions. For example,
[79] could not find the encoding function even with a very short code length as 16 bits.
Thus the research outcome becomes impractical without a systematic way to obtain the
encoding function of the security codes. In this section, we introduce a number of classes
of security codes generated by binary linear resilient functions by taking advantage of
matrix general inverse algorithms in [80, 81].
Let function f in Eq. (4.2) be a linear function, and ST be the transpose of S.
S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) = f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) can be denoted as:
ST = D(x1, x2, · · · , xn)T (4.9)
where D is an m× n dimension matrix:
D = [d1, d2, · · · , dm] =

d1,1 d1,2 · · · d1,n
d2,1 d2,2 · · · d2,n
...
...
. . .
...
dm,1 dm,2 · · · dm,n

where di,j ∈ {0, 1}
Example 4.1: An (7, 3, 3) linear resilient function f is:
f(x1, x2, · · · , x7) = (x4 + x5 + x6 + x7, x2 + x3 + x6 + x7, x1 + x3 + x5 + x7)
Then we have:
S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) = f(x1, x2, · · · , x7) =

0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 (x1, x2, · · · , x7)T
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From (n,m, t) resilient functions, we have following encoding construction for the
security code.
Construction 4.1: Let D be an m×n matrix from a (n,m, t) resilient function. Let
G be an m×n matrix such that D ·GT ·D = D. Given S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) as the secret
information launched by the legitimate user, the encoding function on S should be:
X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) = S ·G+V (4.10)
where V is an arbitrary n dimension vector such that D · VT = 0, and X is (n,m)
security code.
To derive G, we firstly perform row and column permutations on D :
D = QL[Im 0]QR (4.11)
where Im is m ×m identity matrix, 0 is m × (n −m) all zero matrix, QL and QR are
m ×m and n × n matrix, respectively. Note that such an operation can be performed
only if D has a full column rank, i.e., r = m, where r is the rank of D. Then G can be
calculated as [80, 81]:
GT = Q−1R [Im B]
TQ−1L (4.12)
where B is m × (n − m) matrix and can be chosen randomly, which means G is not
unique. Here we randomly choose one to calculate the encoded security information bits
S as S ·G.
If D is not fully column ranked ( i.e., r < m), D can be transferred into the form:
D = QL
Ir 0
0 0
QR (4.13)
where Ir is r × r identity matrix, then G can be calculated as:
GT = Q−1R
 Ir B12
B21 B22
Q−1L (4.14)
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where B12, B21 and B22 are r × (m − r), (n − r) × r and (n − r) × (m − r) matrix,
respectively, which can be chosen randomly to calculate S ·G .
The rate of the secret code from Construction 4.1 is r/n. If D has a full column
rank, the rate of the secret code is m/n .
One method in finding vector V in (4.10) is shown as following. Let DH be a (n −
m)× n matrix such that
DH ·DT = 0 (4.15)
where 0 is (n−m)×m all-zero matrix. Let an n−m dimension vector denoted as K be
randomly selected for computing V = K ·DH , which means that one source message S
will correspond to numerous outputs X when a matrix G is given. From (4.10) to (4.15),
all arithmetic is done in GF (2).
By launching X into the channel, the receivers will receive Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) which
is the noisy version of X. Decoding the secret information S˜ = (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) from Z
yields:
S˜ = (z1, z2, · · · , zn)DT (4.16)
Theorem 4.2: A security code generated from Construction 4.1 can ensure secret
information S from leaking to any eavesdropper under BSC channel when the crossover
probability of the wiretape channel is pw where pw ≥ (n−t)2n . In other words, the average
error rate at the eavesdropper (i.e., Pwe in (2.2) and (2.4)) approaches to 0.5 with n→∞
if pw ≥ (n−t)2n .
The proof of Theorem 4.2 directly follows by combining Theorem 4.1 with Lemma
4.2. We call this crossover probability pw as the threshold probability, and denote the
security code accordingly as (n,m, pw). From this theorem we can know that the proposed
security codes satisfaction security condition (2.4).
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4.3 Non-Binary Security Code Construction
4.3.1 Preliminaries
The binary security codes developed in the previous section are feasible and practically
implementable for our purpose. However, its threshold probabilities could be way larger
than that in [33] which gives
pw ≥ 1− 2−R (4.17)
which leads to low security capacity. In the effort of searching for solutions with smaller
threshold probabilities, we observed that an (n,m, d) linear code meeting the Singleton
bound [84], also referred to as Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes, can be used
to form an (n,m, d− 1) resilient function [60]; and the security codes generated by such
resilient functions will yield a threshold probabilities R/2, where R = m/n is defined as
the rate of the codes. In the following, Lemma 4.3 and 4.4 support the above statements,
respectively.
Lemma 4.3: Let D be a generating matrix for an (n,m, d) linear code. Define a
function f : [GF(2)]n → [GF(2)]m by the rule:
f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ·DT (4.18)
Then f is an (n,m, d− 1) resilient function.
The proof of this lemma can be seen in [60].
Lemma 4.4: If a security code is constructed from the resilient function derived from
the MDS codes, we have its threshold probability as R
2
.
Proof : According to [84], an (n,m, d) MDS code meets the Singleton bound and
follows the relation:
d = n−m+ 1 (4.19)
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Therefore, the security code constructed from (n,m, d−1) resilient function corresponding
to the MDS code has its threshold probability as:
pw ≥ n− d+ 1
2n
=
R
2
(4.20)
Lemma 4.5: The threshold probability of a security code in turn derives from a
resilient function corresponding to a MDS code is always better (or smaller) than that
by [33], i.e., (1− 2−R) ≥ R
2
for 0 ≤ R ≤ 1.
Proof : Define y(R) = (1 − 2−R) − R
2
. y′(R) = ∂y(R)
∂R
= 2−R · ln(2) − 1
2
= 0 occurs
when R = 1 + log2(ln2). Obviously, we have y
′(R) ≥ 0 with R ∈ [0, 1 + log2(ln 2)], which
means that y(R) increases monotonically, and y(R) ≥ 0 with R ∈ [0, 1 + log2(ln 2)] since
y(0) = 0. Similarly we have y′(R) ≤ 0 with R ∈ [1 + log2(ln 2), 1]; thus y(0) ≥ 0 with
R ∈ [1 + log2(ln 2), 1].
To summarize the above three lemmas, the security codes derive from the resilient
functions corresponding to the MDS codes always yield better threshold probabilities
than that of [33], which is the best reported for short length security codes under BSC so
far. However, to the best of our knowledge, all binary MDS codes are trivial codes that
are not practically implementable. This motivates us to explore the possibility of using
non-binary MDS codes as the vehicle toward the desired security codes.
4.3.2 Nonbinary Resilient Functions
In this section, we extend the notions of resilient functions to functions over finite al-
phabet, and similarly, we follow the definition on non-binary resilient function given in
[85].
Definition 4.2 [85]: Let q be the power of a certain prime number, Define function
F : GF(q)n → GF(q)m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) be the set of random input
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variables assuming values from GF(q) with uniform distributions (that is, every possible
input vector occurs with an equal probability 1/qm ). Let X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ GF(q)n
and Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∈ GF(q)n denote the set of output variables of the function F.
Given F(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm), we need to have:
Pr(F(z1, z2, · · · , zn) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)|xij = zil) =
1
qm
(4.21)
where 0 ≤ j, l ≤ t, for any t-subset (i1, i2, · · · , it) ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n}. Such a function F
is called a non-binary (q, n,m, t) resilient function. In other words, if Z intercepts t
or less symbols from X, F(z1, z2, · · · , zn) only has a probability of 1qm to obtain vector
(s1, s2, · · · , sm) .
Samilar to Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.3 provides the threshold on the Symbol Error
Rate (SER) for the wiretapper above which no information will be intercepted.
Theorem 4.3: Let Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) be a noisy version of X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn).
X and Z take values from GF(q). Let F be an (q, n,m, t) resilient function. Let
F(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm), and F(z1, z2, · · · , zn) = (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m). Let the
SER between X and Z be denoted as ps , i.e.Pr(xi 6= zi) = ps. If:
ps ≥ q − 1
q
· (n− t)
n
(4.22)
then we have:
Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)) = 1
qm
(4.23)
Proof : Obviously, there are randomly and independently t symbols correctly taken by Z
and 1/q of the remaining n−t symbols correctly taken by Z too, while the other (n−t)(q−1)
q
symbols being incorrectly taken. Therefore, the total correct symbols in Z are t + n−t
q
,
and the total error bits in Z are q−1
q
· (n − t). Thus we have Pr(xi 6= zi) = q−1q · n−tn .
Combining with Definition 4.2, we can get the results immediately.
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4.3.3 Non-binary Resilient Functions Construction
The resilient functions used in numeric cryptography are subject to stringent require-
ments on high orders of resiliency, nonlinearity, and algebraic degree [91]. However, in
the targeted scenario of this study, an (q, n,m, t) resilient function is desired to have as
large m as possible with a given n and t, where the nonlinearity and algebraic degree are
completely not a concern. (4.19) and (4.20) indicate that a non-binary resilient function
(q, n,m, t) derived from a MDS code can provide optimal parameter m.
Among very few reported non-binary resilient function constructions, the study con-
siders the one derived from non-binary linear codes. The relationship between non-binary
linear codes and non-binary resilient functions is given in Lemma 4.5, which is a simple
extension from Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.6 [91]: D is a generating matrix for an (n,m, d) linear code over GF(q) if
and only if the function F : [GF(q)n]→ [GF(q)m] defined by the rule F(x1, x2, · · · , xn) =
(x1, x2, · · · , xn) ·DT is an (q, n,m, t) - resilient function.
An optimal resilient function (i.e., with the optimal m) can be obtained from the
corresponding MDS code. Without loss of generality, the study employs Reed-Solomon
codes (or RS codes) [92] which is the most commonly used MDS codes, for construction
of the resilient functions. Note that any other MDS codes such as rank metric codes [93]
can serve for the same purpose.
By taking the prime as 2, we have q = 2k, where k is any positive integer. Let α be a
primitive element in GF(q). A td -error correcting RS code has the generator polynomial:
g¯(x) =
b+2td−1∏
j=b
(x− αj) (4.24)
where b is an integer, usually b = 0 or b = 1. RS codes are also a kind of cyclic codes.
Therefore, The q−1 dimension vectors associated with the coefficients of the polynomials
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g¯(x), xg¯(x), x2g¯(x), · · · , xq−2td−2g¯(x) can be used as rows of the generating matrix D.
This code is a (q−1, q−2td−1, 2td+1) RS code. The function F : [GF(q)n]→ [GF(q)m]
defined as F(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ·DT is in fact a (q, q − 1, q − 2td − 1, 2td)
resilient function, in which n = q − 1 and m = q − 2td − 1.
4.3.4 Non-binary Security Code Construction
The results of the binary case can immediately generalize to functions over GF(q) .
Construction 4.2: Let D be an m×n dimension matrix from an (q, n,m, t) resilient
function. By (4.11) to (4.14) in Construction 4.1, we can find matrix G from D over
GF(q) such that D·GT ·D = D. Then we take matrix G to encode the secret information
S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm) as:
X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) = S ·G+V (4.25)
where V is an n dimension vector which is randomly chosen such that D ·VT = 0. Here
all the arithmetic operations are done in GF(q). Then we get a q -ray (q, n,m) security
code from the (q, n,m, t) resilient function.
The rate of the secret code from Construction 4.2 is the same as that of the code
from Construction 4.1. The method to find vector V in Construction 4.1 also can
be used here. The encoded vector X is sent through the channel, and the wiretapper
will receive Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) which is the a noisy version of X. Similar to the binary
case, decoding the estimate sequence of the secret information S = (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) from
Z yields:
S = (z1, z2, · · · , zn)DT (4.26)
From Theorem 4.3, if the SER between X and Z is equal to or larger than q−1
q
·
(n−t)
n
the decoding result S˜ = (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) will become uniformly distributed over
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GF(q)m. Given q = 2k and for every k-bit vector Vω there is a corresponding element
ω ∈ GF(2k) due to isomorphism between GF(2k) and {0, 1}k such that Vωj ∈ {0, 1}k ⇔
ωj ∈ GF(2k), 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k − 1. By Considering the model in Figure 4.2, k × m bits
Sb = (s
1
1, s
2
1, · · · , sk1, s12, s22, · · · , sk2, · · · , s1m, s2m, · · · , skm) are first converted into m symbols
S = (s1, s2, · · · , sm), where si = (s1i , s2i , · · · , ski ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m ; then (s1, s2, · · · , sm) is
further encoded to X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) via (4.25), which becomes noisy version Z =
(z1, z2, · · · , zn) after passing a channel with SER ps. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we ignore the effect due to modulation.
According to (4.26), (z1, z2, · · · , zn) is decoded as S˜ = (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m). Finally, by
mapping the symbols of GF(2k) into binary vectors of length k we get output as k ×m
bits S˜b = (s˜
1
1, s˜
2
1, · · · , s˜k1, s˜12, s˜22, · · · , s˜k2, · · · , s˜1m, s˜2m, · · · , s˜km) from (s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m).
From the perspective of the BSC, the encoded sequence X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) can
also be mapped into k×m bits Xb = (x11, x21, · · · , xk1, x12, x22, · · · , xk2, · · · , x1m, x2m, · · · , xkm),
and launched in the BSC with a crossover probability pb which yields the noisy version
Zb = (z
1
1 , z
2
1 , · · · , zk1 , z12 , z22 , · · · , zk2 , · · · , z1m, z2m, · · · , zkm). Then we can get (z1, z2, · · · , zn)
by mapping k bits into one symbol.
Figure 4.2: The non-binary security encoding and decoding model
Theorem 4.4: In the model of Figure 4.2, with the following condition on symbol
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error probability pw s:
Pr(xi 6= zi) = pw s ≥ q − 1
q
· (n− t)
n
, q = 2k (4.27)
we have: (i) the average BER at the eavesdropper is approaches to 0.5 with n → ∞,
i.e. Pr(sji 6= s˜ji ) = pe = 0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k; and (ii) the corresponding crossover
probability of BSC, i.e., Pr(xji 6= zji ) = pw b , is subject to the condition:
pw b ≥ (n− t)
2n
(4.28)
Proof : (i) Theorem 4.3 shows that with pw s ≥ q−1q · (n−t)n , we have Pr((s˜1, s˜2, · · · , s˜m) =
(s1, s2, · · · , sm)) = 1qm . Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2, let Sb j = (s11, s21, · · · , sk1, s12, s22, · · · ,
sk2, · · · , s1m, s2m, · · · , skm)j and Sj = (s1, s2, · · · , sm)j represent a distinct binary sequence
of length km and symbol sequence of length m, respectively. Because Sj is uniformly
distributed over GF(q)m, every vector Sj occurs with a probability Pr(Sj) =
1
qm
, which
also means every vector Sb j occurs with probability Pr(Sb j) =
1
qm
. Thus the average
BER of the recovering message S˜b j is:
Pr(sji 6= s˜ji |Z) =
Average ] of erroneous bits
km
=
qm∑
j=1
Pr(Sb j)
1
km
∑
k 6=j
Pr(S˜b = Sb k)d(Sb j,Sb k)
=
1
km
∑
k 6=j
1
qm
· d(Sb j,Sb k) ;
=
1
km
· 1
qm
∑
k 6=j
d(Sb j,Sb k)
Form (4.8), we have:
Pr(sji 6= s˜ji | Z) =
1
km
· 1
qm
· (km) · 2km−1 = 1
2
(4.29)
(ii) To prove the condition on crossover probability, we firstly argue that all symbol errors
are equiprobable and occur with a probability:
pw s
q − 1 (4.30)
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Thus with zi = (z
1
i , z
2
i , · · · , zki ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m , there are
 k
a
 ways in which a bits
out of k are in error. Hence, the average number of bit errors per k-bit symbol is:
pw b =
k∑
a=1
a ·
 k
a
 · pw s
q − 1/k (4.31)
From (4.8) and (4.27), we have:
pw b ≥ k · 2k−1 · q − 1
q(q − 1) ·
(n− t)
n
· 1
k
=
(n− t)
2n
(4.32)
This result is the same as that of the binary case in Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.4 defines two thresholds on the SER pw s and BSC crossover probability
pw b for a (2
k, n,m) security code derived from a (2k, n,m, t) resilient function. We define
the kind of security codes generated from Construction 4.2 as (2k, n,m, pw b). From this
theorem we can know that the proposed non-binary security codes satisfaction security
condition (2.4).
4.4 Security Code Performance
In this section, numerical results through case studies are presented to demonstrate the
performance evaluation using the proposed approach.
4.4.1 Binary Security Codes
Construction 4.1 is based on binary resilient functions (n,m, d− 1), which can be gen-
erated by a corresponding linear code (n,m, d) [60]. In the experiment we implemented
simplex codes (2m − 1,m, 2m−1), which are the dual of Hamming codes, so as to yield
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a (2m − 1,m, 2m−1 − 1) linear resilient function. Figure 4.3 shows the BER after apply-
ing the security codes versus the crossover probability p of the BSC before applying the
security codes.
Figure 4.3: The performance of security codes generated by Construction 4.1
4.4.2 Non-binary Security Codes
In the experiment, a family of (2k, 2k − 1, 2k − 2td − 1, 12 − td2k−1) non-binary security
codes were generated by the non-binary resilient functions (2k − 1, 2k − 2td − 1, 2td) via
Construction 4.2, which is in turn derived by RS codes (2k − 1, 2k − 2td − 1, 2td + 1),
where td is an integer such that 1 ≤ td < 2k − 1. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the
SER and BER of the generated non-binary security codes with short code lengths versus
channel error rate.
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Figure 4.4: The SER performance of non-binary security codes derived from non-binary
resilient function corresponding to RS codes
By using doubly extended RS codes, we can get a family of q-ary code with a wider
range of parameter selection. Let q = 2k, α be a primitive element in GF(q) and td
be an integer such that 1 ≤ td ≤ 2k − 1. The doubly extended RS codes of dimension
m = 2k − 1− 2td are the codes defined over GF(q) with a generating matrix:
D =

1 1 1 · · · 1 1 0
1 α α2 · · · αq−2 0 0
1 α2 α4 · · · α(q−2)2 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 αm−2 α2(m−2) · · · α(q−2)(m−2) 0 0
1 αm−1 α2(m−1) · · · α(q−2)(m−1) 0 1

This family of codes is (q + 1,m, q − m + 2) q-ary codes, where the first n ≤ q + 1
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Figure 4.5: The BER performance of non-binary security codes derived from non-binary
resilient function corresponding to RS codes
columns of D form the generating matrix D0 for the (n,m, n−m + 1) q-ary code. The
function F : GF(q)n → GF(q)m defined as F(X) = X(D0)T is in fact a (q, n,m, n−m)
resilient function, by which we can derive the family of q-ary security codes denoted as(
q, n,m, m
2n
)
. The performance of proposed security codes is shown in Figure 4.6 and
Figure 4.7.
A comparison of proposed non-binary security codes with reported security codes
under BSC is given in Table I. We assume that the error probability of the main channel
is 10−3 and the crossover probability of eavesdropper channel is 0.5. The security capacity
Cs is calculated according to (2.10). Table 4.2 shows that the rate of proposed security
codes is lower than that of security codes derived from polar codes, but the proposed
security codes have much shorter code lengths which is key point for energy limitation
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Figure 4.6: The SER performance of non-binary security codes derived from non-binary
resilient function corresponding to doubly extended RS codes
wireless applications.
4.5 Security System Performance
Without loss of generality, the study considers LDPC [96] as the encoding scheme χ2
in (3.7). Note that LDPC exhibits a threshold phenomenon under a certain decoding
method, which determines the asymptotic behavior of the ensemble of the code. In specif-
ic, Parallel Concatenated LDPC (PC-LDPC) codes [96] are adopted in our performance
evaluation, which demonstrates rate compatibility and adaptation to varying channel
qualities. The parity-check matrix H of the PC-LDPC codes can be expressed as:
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Table 4.2: A comparison of proposed non-binary security codes with reported security
codes under BSC
pw
Polar codes [61] Proposed security codes Rate in [33]
Code length Rate R % of Cs Security codes Rate R % of Cs Security codes Rate R
0.45
220
0.933 95.1%
(
25, 33, 29, 2966
)
0.879 89.6% (65, 56) 0.863
0.4 0.822 91.9%
(
24, 17, 13, 1334
)
0.765 79.7% (65, 48) 0.737
0.35 0.817 88.5%
(
25, 33, 23, 2366
)
0.697 75.5% (29, 18) 0.622
0.3 0.738 84.8%
(
24, 15, 9, 930
)
0.6 69% (31, 16) 0.515
0.25 0.647 80.9%
(
25, 31, 15, 1562
)
0.484 60.6% (65, 27) 0.415
0.2 0.543 76.4%
(
25, 33, 13, 1366
)
0.394 55.5% (65, 21) 0.323
0.15 0.425 71.1%
(
24, 17, 5, 534
)
0.294 49.2% (17, 4) 0.235
0.1 0.293 64.0%
(
24, 15, 3, 110
)
0.2 43.7% (33, 5) 0.152
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Figure 4.7: The BER performance of non-binary security codes derived from non-binary
resilient function corresponding to doubly extended RS codes
H =

Hd1 H
p
1 0 · · · 0
Hd2 0 H
p
2 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
Hds 0 0 · · · Hps
 (4.33)
We employ seven random LDPC codes with rate 1/2 as component codes. The overall
code (mother code) length and rate are 10000 and 1/8 , respectively. The source block
has 1250 bits. The component matrixes Hdi and H
p
i in (4.33) have 1250 columns and
1250 rows with 3 weight for every column and row. By puncture the component matrixes
Hpi from the mother code matrix H , we can get the LDPC codes with a length from
2500 to 10000 and the rate from 1/2 to 1/8. The belief propagation iterative decoding
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algorithm is used and maximum number of iterations is 200. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9
show the performances of these codes over BSC, AWGN channel and Rayleigh Channel,
respectively. With the LPDC implementation, performances are launched by taking
Figure 4.8: The BER performances of LDPC codes under BSC channel
δ = 1 (one round interactive communication [55]) and δ = 2 (two rounds interactive
communication) over the three different channels. The results are shown in Tables 4.3-
4.8. The second line of Table 4.3 is the performance results for the scheme in [55] under
BSC. Table 4.5 and Table 4.7 are the performance results for the one-round scheme under
AWGN and Rayleigh channel, which is our extended research results from [55]. Table
4.4, Table 4.6 and Table 4.8 are the performance results for the novel MRTWC scheme
under the three different channels.
The BER due to the LDPC decoding process is given in the tables, where Pir and
PEve denotes the BER at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper after Channel Codes
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Figure 4.9: The BER performances of LDPC codes under AWGN and Rayleigh channels
(CC) decoding, respectively. PB s and PE s denote the SER of Bob and Eve after Security
Codes (SC) decoding, respectively; while PB and PE denote the BER of Bob and Eve
after security codes decoding, respectively. SC and CC are the logogram of security
code and channel code.
Under AWGN channel and Rayleigh channel, corresponding to Eb
N0
in Figure 4.7, SNR
γ in Table 4.5 to Table 4.8 was calculated as:
γ =
Eb
N0
+ 10 log10 R (4.34)
where R is the code rate of LDPC codes. For example, in table 4.5, with γ1 = −1dB
and γe 1 = −1dB the BER of the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are Pr(V) =
0.105 and Pr(Ve) = 0.188 by (3.47) and (3.48), which corresponding to γ = −1dB and
γ = −4.06dB from (3.38). If we consider R = 1
2
, by (4.34) we can get Eb
N0
= 2.0103dB and
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Table 4.3: The performance under BSC channel (δ = 1)
Crossover α = 0.06 α = 0.08 α = 0.08 α = 0.15 α = 0.15
Probability β = 0.06 β = 0.04 β = 0.08 β = 0.075 β = 0.15
BER after Pr(V) = 0.06 Pr(V) = 0.08 Pr(V) = 0.15 Pr(V) = 0.15 Pr(V) = 0.15
interaction Pr(Ve) = 0.1128 Pr(Ve) = 0.1136 Pr(Ve) = 0.1472 Pr(Ve) = 0.2138 Pr(Ve) = 0.255
LDPC code (5000, 1/4) (5000, 1/4) (10000, 1/8) (10000, 1/8) (10000, 1/8)
BER after Pir < 1.5× 10−5 Pir < 1.5× 10−5 Pir < 1.5× 10−5 Pir < 3.5× 10−4 Pir < 3.5× 10−4
CC decoding PEve = 0.0105 PEve = 0.0113 PEve = 0.077 PEve = 0.085 PEve = 0.198
Cs 0.0838 0.089 0.3913 0.4150 0.7134
Security codes (28, 255, 5, 1
102
) (28, 255, 5, 1
102
) (25, 33, 5, 5
66
) (25, 33, 5, 5
62
) (25, 33, 5, 13
66
)
SER after PB s < 1.265× 10−4 PB s < 1.265× 10−4 PB s < 2.044× 10−4 PB s < 4.40× 10−3 PB < 9.881× 10−3
SC decoding PE s = 0.9961 PE s = 0.9961 PE s = 0.96975 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875
BER after PB < 6.35× 10−5 PB < 6.35× 10−5 PB < 1.055× 10−4 PB < 2.271× 10−3 PB < 5.1× 10−3
SC decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
Eb
N0
= −1.0497dB corresponding to γ = −1dB and γ = −4.06dB. From Figure 4.6, the
BER of (2500, 1/2) LDPC code is 5.6× 10−5 when Eb
N0
= 1.75dB. Therefore, (2500, 1/2)
LDPC code is chosen and the BER of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper after
channel codes decoding are Pir < 5.6× 10−5 and PEve = 0.112, respectively.
From Table 4.3 to 4.8 we can know that the eavesdropper is subject to an error
probability close to 0.5 while the main channel is almost error-free even if the eavesdropper
has better channel. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed security
codes and MRTWC mechanisms for achieving unconditionally secure communications.
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Table 4.4: The performance under BSC channel (δ = 2)
Crossover α1 = α2 = 0.04 α1 = α2 = 0.06 α1 = α2 = 0.06 α1 = α2 = 0.08 α1 = α2 = 0.08
Probability β1 = β2 = 0.04 β1 = β2 = 0.04 β1 = β2 = 0.06 β1 = β2 = 0.04 β1 = β2 = 0.08
BER after P (Y) = 0.0768 P (Y) = 0.1128 P (Y) = 0.1128 P (Y) = 0.1472 P (Y) = 0.1472
interaction P (Z) = 0.1418 P (Z) = 0.1723 P (Z) = 0.2002 P (Z) = 0.201 P (Z) = 0.251
LDPC code (5000,1/4) (7500,1/6) (7500,1/6) (10000,1/8) (10000,1/8)
BER after Pir < 1.5× 10−5 Pir < 1.16× 10−5 Pir < 1.16× 10−5 Pir = 1.9× 10−5 Pir = 1.9× 10−5
CC decoding PEve = 0.073 PEve = 0.125 PEve = 0.172 PEve = 0.051 PEve = 0.195
Cs 0.3804 0.5434 0.6621 0.288 0.6713
Security codes (26, 63, 9, 114) (2
5, 31, 7, 762) (2
5, 33, 11, 16) (2
5, 31, 3, 362) (2
5, 33, 11, 16)
SER after PB s = 1.727× 10−4 PB s = 3.993× 10−4 PB s = 8.738× 10−4 PB s = 4.067× 10−3 PB s = 1.048× 10−3
SC decoding PE s = 0.9844 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875
BER after PB = 8.77× 10−5 PB = 2.061× 10−4 PB = 4.516× 10−4 PB = 2.099× 10−3 PB = 5.411× 10−3
SC decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
Table 4.5: The performance under AWGN channel (δ = 1)
SNR γ1 = −1dB γ1 = −5dB γ1 = −5dB γ1 = −7dB γ1 = −9db
γe 1 = −1dB γe 1 = −2dB γe 1 = −5dB γe 1 = −3dB γe 1 = −9db
BER after Pr(V) = 0.105 Pr(V) = 0.212 Pr(V) = 0.212 Pr(V) = 0.266 Pr(V) = 0.307
interaction Pr(Ve) = 0.188 Pr(Ve) = 0.288 Pr(Ve) = 0.334 Pr(Ve) = 0.340 Pr(Ve) = 0.426
LDPC codes (2500, 1/2) (5000, 1/4) (5000, 1/4) (7500, 1/6) (10000, 1/8)
BER after CC Pir < 5.6× 10−5 Pir < 2.7× 10−5 Pir < 2.7× 10−5 Pir < 1.72× 10−5 Pir < 4.5× 10−5
decoding PEve = 0.112 PEve = 0.308 PEve = 0.354 PEve = 0.379 PEve = 0.456
Cs 0.505 0.8904 0.9371 0.9570 0.9937
Security codes
(
25, 33, 7, 766
) (
25, 31, 19, 1962
) (
24, 17, 11, 1134
) (
24, 15, 11, 1130
) (
24, 15, 13, 1330
)
SER after SC PB s < 1.033× 10−3 PB s < 1.187× 10−3 PB s < 5.348× 10−4 PB s < 3.032× 10−4 PB s < 1.266× 10−3
decoding PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375
BER after SC PB < 5.335× 10−4 PB < 6.127× 10−4 PB < 2.852× 10−4 PB < 1.617× 10−4 PB < 6.753× 10−4
decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
65
Security System Performance
Table 4.6: The performance under AWGN channel (δ = 2)
SNR γ1 = γ2 = 1dB γ1 = γ2 = −1dB γ1 = γ2 = −3dB γ1 = γ2 = −4dB
γe 1 = γe 2 = 1dB γe 1 = γe 2 = 2dB γe 1 = γe 2 = −1dB γe 1 = γe 2 = −4dB
BER after Pr(V) = 0.106 Pr(V) = 0.188 Pr(V) = 0.266 Pr(V) = 0.304
interaction Pr(Ve) = 0.1895 Pr(Ve) = 0.232 Pr(Ve) = 0.353 Pr(Ve) = 0.423
LDPC codes (2500, 1/2) (5000, 1/4) (7500, 1/6) (10000, 1/8)
BER after CC Pir < 5.6× 10−5 Pir < 2.7× 10−5 Pir < 1.72× 10−5 Pir < 4.5× 10−5
decoding PEve = 0.281 PEve = 0.032 PEve = 0.393 PEve = 0.457
Cs 0.8559 0.2039 0.9664 0.9939
Security codes
(
25, 31, 17, 1762
) (
26, 63, 3, 142
) (
24, 15, 11, 1130
) (
24, 15, 13, 1330
)
SER after SC PB s < 1.845× 10−3 PB s < 2.431× 10−4 PB s < 3.032× 10−4 PB s < 1.266× 10−3
decoding PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.9844 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375
BER after SC PB < 9.522× 10−4 PB < 1.235× 10−4 PB < 1.617× 10−4 PB < 6.753× 10−4
decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
Table 4.7: The performance under Rayleigh channel (δ = 1)
SNR γ1 = 2dB γ1 = −1dB γ1 = −3dB γ1 = −5dB γ1 = −7db
γe 1 = 2dB γe 1 = 2dB γe 1 = −3dB γe 1 = −3dB γe 1 = −7db
BER after Pr(V) = 0.122 Pr(V) = 0.177 Pr(V) = 0.218 Pr(V) = 0.264 Pr(V) = 0.301
interaction Pr(Ve) = 0.214 Pr(Ve) = 0.256 Pr(Ve) = 0.341 Pr(Ve) = 0.367 Pr(Ve) = 0.421
LDPC codes (2500, 1/2) (5000, 1/4) (5000, 1/4) (7500, 1/6) (10000, 1/8)
BER after CC Pir < 5.85× 10−5 Pir < 1.63× 10−5 Pir < 1.63× 10−5 Pir < 4.671× 10−5 Pir < 6.331× 10−5
decoding PEve = 0.273 PEve = 0.025 PEve = 0.392 PEve = 0.387 PEve = 0.448
Cs 0.8448 0.1684 0.9658 0.9621 0.9912
Security codes
(
25, 33, 17, 1766
) (
26, 63, 3, 142
) (
24, 15, 11, 1130
) (
24, 15, 11, 1130
) (
24, 15, 13, 1330
)
SER after SC PB s < 1.812× 10−3 PB s < 1.681× 10−4 PB s < 2.61× 10−4 PB s < 1.166× 10−3 PB s < 1.562× 10−3
decoding PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.9844 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375
BER after SC PB < 9.351× 10−4 PB < 8.539× 10−5 PB < 1.392× 10−4 PB < 6.217× 10−4 PB < 8.333× 10−4
decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
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Table 4.8: The performance under Rayleigh channel (δ = 2)
SNR γ1 = γ2 = 6dB γ1 = γ2 = 2dB γ1 = γ2 = 1dB γ1 = γ2 = −1dB
γe 1 = γe 2 = 6dB γe 1 = γe 2 = 6dB γe 1 = γe 2 = 2dB γe 1 = γe 2 = −1dB
BER after Pr(V) = 0.139 Pr(V) = 0.214 Pr(V) = 0.256 Pr(V) = 0.291
interaction Pr(Ve) = 0.239 Pr(Ve) = 0.294 Pr(Ve) = 0.360 Pr(Ve) = 0.413
LDPC codes (2500, 1/2) (5000, 1/4) (7500, 1/6) (10000, 1/8)
BER after CC Pir < 5.85× 10−5 Pir < 1.63× 10−5 Pir < 4.671× 10−5 Pir < 6.331× 10−5
decoding PEve = 0.286 PEve = 0.322 PEve = 0.382 PEve = 0.437
Cs 0.8626 0.9063 0.9587 0.9875
Security codes
(
25, 33, 17, 1766
) (
25, 31, 19, 1962
) (
24, 15, 11, 1130
) (
24, 15, 13, 1330
)
SER after SC PB s < 1.812× 10−3 PB s < 6.822× 10−4 PB s < 1.166× 10−3 PB s < 1.562× 10−3
decoding PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.96875 PE s = 0.9375 PE s = 0.9375
BER after SC PB < 9.351× 10−4 PB < 3.521× 10−4 PB < 6.217× 10−4 PB < 8.333× 10−4
decoding PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5 PE = 0.5
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A Cross-layer Approach to
Achieving Unconditionally Secure
Communication via DFRFT
This chapter investigates a cross-layer approach to achieve unconditional communication
security via DFRFT. The cryptographic techniques implemented in the higher layer is
combined with the physical layer security scheme using random parameters flipping of
DFRFT to provide security advantages for legitimate partners. The proposed scheme
introduces a distorted signal parameter instead of a general signal parameter for wireless
networks based on DFRFT [56, 106, 107]. The transmitter randomly flip-flops between
the distorted signal parameter and the general signal parameter for confusing the at-
tacker. An upper-layer pseudorandom sequence will be employed to control the flip-flops
process. In this approach the physical-layer can utilize upper-layer encryption techniques
for security, while physical-layer security techniques can also assist the security design in
the upper layers. The advantages between legitimate partners building from the cross-
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layer scheme are extended via developing the security codes on top of our cross-layer
DFRFT security communication model, aiming to achieve an error-free legitimate chan-
nel while preventing the eavesdropper from any useful information. Thus, a strong secure
model is built.
5.1 Introduction
Cross-layer is another way to build the wiretap channel under the single antenna sys-
tem. Reference [55, 114, 103, 104] presented that the physical-layer security under the
information-theoretic security models can achieve exponentially close to perfect secre-
cy in theory if suitably long codes are used for privacy amplification. There are no
computational restrictions to be placed on the eavesdropper in physical-layer security
system. However, the information theoretic security is an average-information measure.
The system can be designed and tuned for a specific level of security e.g., with very
high probability a block is secure, but it may not be able to guarantee security with
probability 1. And the application of the information-theoretic security models subjects
to limitations under the channel rapid variations scenarios. In the other hand, the se-
curity in classical cryptography system is based on unproven assumptions regarding the
hardness of certain computational tasks. Therefore, systems are insecure if assumptions
are wrong or if efficient attacks are developed. So any deployment of a physical-layer
security protocol in a classical system would be part of a “layered security” solution
where security is provided at a number of different layers, each with a specific goal in
mind. Innovative cross-layer security designs considering both physical-layer security and
upper-layer traditional security techniques are desirable for wireless networks.
Discrete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT) is a generalization and has been ap-
plied in optics, quantum mechanics, and signal processing areas [56, 106]. Pei and Hsue
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[107] extended the DFRFT to propose multiple-parameter discrete fractional Fourier
transform (MPDFRFT) which has all of the desired properties for fractional transforms
[108]. They also exploited the multiple-parameter feature of DFRFT to serve as encrypt-
ing digital data via proposing the double random phase encoding. Amr [109] pointed
out that all the building blocks are linear, and hence, breaking this scheme via known
plaintext attack is equivalent to solving a set of linear equations. [110, 111, 112, 57, 113]
proposed several approaches of digital image encryption based on the fractional Fourier
transform and chaos.
A practical solutions toward the construction of unconditionally secure communica-
tion systems via cross-layer approach is presented by utilizing the multi dynamic param-
eters of DFRFT system. By introducing one or several distorted signal parameters, the
sender randomly flip-flops between the distorted signal parameter and the general signal
parameter with a pseudorandom sequence cipher, which is pre-shared between the le-
gitimate partners.By this way, the advantages of the legitimate partners are guaranteed.
This advantages of the main channel can be extended by putting the security codes on top
of cross-layer DFRFT security communication model to achieve an reliability receiving
of the legitimate channel while BER of the eavesdropper approaches to 0.5.
5.2 Discrete Fractional Fourier Transform
In this Section, following the definition of the continuous fractional Fourier transform
(FRFT) [116], the definition of the discrete fractional Fourier transform (DFRFT) is
given.
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5.2.1 Continuous Fractional Fourier Transform
The pth order FRFT of a time domain signal x (t) is defined as [56]:
Xp (u) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Kp (u, t)x (t) dt (5.1)
where Kp (u, t) is kernel given by
Kp (u, t) = Aα exp
[
jpi
(
u2 cotα− 2ut cscα + t2 cotα)] (5.2)
in which n is integer, Aα =
√
1− j cotα, and α = ppi/2 is the rotation angle of FRFT,
p 6= 2n. When p = 0, Xp (u) is the signal x (t) itself after FRFT. When p = 1, FRFT is
the conventional Fourier transform (FT).
The inverse of an FRFT (IFRFT) with an order p is the FRFT with order −p ac-
cording to the following relation:
x (t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Xp (u)K−p (t, u) du (5.3)
5.2.2 Discrete Fractional Fourier Transform
Let x(n) be a sampled periodic signal with a period ∆t and n=−N,−N + 1, ..., N , in
which N is the sampling interval of the signal x(n). If we have function y(n) =x(n∆t),
let ∆u is the sampled period of y(n), the pth order discrete fractional Fourier transform
(DFRFT) of x(n) is given by [56]:
Xp (m) =
∑N
n=−N K
α,∆t,∆u
p (m,n)x (n) (5.4)
where Kα,∆t,∆up is DFRFT transform matrix and defined as:
Kα,∆t,∆up =
√
|sinα| − jsgn (sinα) cosα
2M + 1
× e j2 cotαm2∆u2e−j sgn(sinα)2pinm2M+1 e j2 cotαn2∆t2 (5.5)
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in which m = −M,−M + 1, ...,M where M is the sampling interval of the function y(n).
The inverse of an DFRFT (IDFRFT) with an order p is the DFRFT with inverse
rotation angle −α and alternating ∆u, ∆t according to the following relation:
x (n) =
∑N
n=−N K
−α,∆u,∆t
p (n,m)Xp (m) (5.6)
When M = N , α = pi/2, IDFRFT becomes the inverse of discrete Fourier transform
(IDFT). When M = N , α = −pi/2, DFRFT becomes the discrete Fourier transform
(DFT).
5.2.3 OFDM System Based on DFRFT
The orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems based on the discrete
fractional Fourier transform is introduced in [117]. In the system, the fast Fourier trans-
form (FFT) and inverse of fast Fourier transform (IFFT) are the replaced by DFRFT
and IDFRFT. Assuming the cyclic prefix (CP) length is Ng, the mth sample of the nth
transmitted frame is given by
X ip (m) =
√
N
N+Ng
∑N−1
n=0 K
−α,∆u,∆t
p,i (m,n)x
i (n) (5.7)
where −Ng ≤ m < N , xi (n) is the symbol to be sent, assuming that different symbols
are independent and identically distributed with a zero mean and average power σ2.
K−α,∆u,∆tp,i (m,n) expresses the calculation elements in IDFRFT with sampling space in
time domain, given by Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6), in which α = p · pi/2, p is the fractional
factor of the transform, ∆u is the sampling space in fractional Fourier domain, and
∆uTs = 2pi |sinα| /N . When α = pi/2, the system is traditional orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) system.
Let h (k, l) be the discrete expression of the channel impulse response (CIR). The pow-
er spectrum of the channel obeys classical power spectra, the cross-correlation function
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of CIR can be described as:
E [h (p, l1) · h (q, l2)] = σ2l J0 (2pi∆tfd) δ (l1 − l2) (5.8)
where ∆t = |p− q| · Ts, σ2l is the total power of the lth path. J0 is the zero-order Bessel
function of the first kind, fd is the maximum Doppler frequency shift, δ(·) is a Kronecker
delta function, (·)∗ represents complex conjugate.
We assume that the frame synchronized at the kth sample of the jth received frame
is written as:
rj (k) =
∑∞
i=−∞
∑N−1
n=−Ng hi,j (k, k −m) · xi (n) ei2piε/N + w (k) (5.9)
where 0 ≤ k < N , w(k) is complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and unit
variance, σ2k, ε = ∆fNTs is the frequency offset relative to the inverse of symbol du-
ration, ∆f is the frequency offset. The CIR of the (j (N +Ng) + n)Ts time and the
l1 + (j − i) (N +Ng)th path is: hi,j (k, l) = h (j (N +Ng) + n, l + (j − i) (N +Ng)).
After removing the CP, the transformed signals of DFRFT can be expressed as:
Xjp (mˆ) =
∑N−1
n=0 K
α,∆t,∆u
p,j (mˆ, n) · rj (n) (5.10)
where 0 ≤ mˆ < N .
5.3 Cross-layer Security Model Based on DFRFT
In the DFRFT-OFDM system, the rotation angle α is one of the most important pa-
rameters. If the rotation angle α is 5o in the transmitter, the rotation angle α is 5o and
4.85o in the receivers, respectively. The error of demodulation is shown in Figure 5.1,
when the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is 0dB (error free). From Figure 5.1 we can know
that the correct signal constellation can be demodulated only and if only the rotation
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angle α is correctly known. Based on this fact, we introduce a distorted signal parameter
instead of a general signal parameter for the DFRFT-OFDM system. The transmitter
randomly flip-flops between the distorted signal parameter and the general signal param-
eter for confusing the attacker. An upper-layer pseudorandom sequence will be employed
to control the flip-flops process.
In our scheme, two different rotation angles are denotes as α1 and α2 in the trans-
mitter. An upper layer sequence set will be used to decide which rotation angle, ei-
ther α1 or α2, is used to calculate the sending signal. Let the control sequence be
Qcontrol = (q1, q2, ..., qn), qi ∈ GF (2). Thenif qi = 0, α1 is taken;if qi = 1, α2 is taken. (5.11)
The control sequence Qcontrol will be the secret key stream between the transmitter and
the intended receiver. An attacker does not know the control sequence Qcontrol, who
possibly know the two different rotation angles α1 and α2. The attacker can not know
when slot the rotation angle α1 or α2 will be taken, which illustrates the ambiguity in
the conventional signal detector. The attacker will receive the signal using a random
sequence instead of the control sequence Qcontrol. The attacker also can directly adopt
the rotation angle α1 or α2 to perform demodulation.
Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.4 illustrate the received results under perfect channel situation
when the rotation angle α1 and α2 taken different values. In Figure 5.2, the rotation
angle α1 taken 0
o and the rotation angle α2 will change from α1 to α1 + 90
o. In Figure
5.3 and Figure 5.4 the rotation angle α1 takes 0
o and 272o, respectively while the rotation
angle α2 will change from α1 to α1 + 0.1
o. Even if the difference between α1 and α2 is
very small, the legitimate partners may obtain the advantages over the attackers. From
Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.4, we can know that the bit error rate (BER) of legitimate receivers
approaches 0 when the BER of attackers is over 0.15 with the difference between α1 and
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Figure 5.1: The signal constellation demodulation results with different parameters α. (a) The
signal constellation before IDFRFT. (b) The signal constellation after IDFRFT. (c) The signal
constellation after demodulation with α = 5o. (d) The signal constellation after demodulation
with α = 4.85o.
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Figure 5.2: Received results of legitimate partners and attackers under α1 = 0o with α2
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α2 over 0.01.
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5.4 Security System Model
Obviously, the scheme described in the previous section goes only half-way to providing
a strong security communication. After DFRFT randomly flip-flopping transmission,
the legitimate partners have better receiving results than that of the attackers. Our
motivation is to let error probability of the legitimate receiver approach to zero and error
probability of attackers close to 0.5, which meet the reliability and security condition Eqs.
(2.3) and (2.4). To achieve this goal, we need the security codes (SC) that developed
in the chapter 4 to degrade the information received by attackers without impairing the
legitimate users. The secure communications model targeted in this study is shown in
Figure 5.5, where the source intends to send m bits message S = (s1, s2, ..., sm) to the
destination. Firstly, the source encodes the message such that
X = χ1 (S) (5.12)
where χ1 is the security encoder function. Alice continues to encode X such that
C = χ2 (X) (5.13)
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Figure 5.5: Security system model.
where χ2 is the channel encoder function. Then IDFRFT is performed under the control
sequence Qcontrol. The sequence V received by the legitimate receiver is the noisy version
of sequence C. Meanwhile, an attacker can also observe the noisy sequence Ve. The
legitimate receiver performs DFRFT under the control sequence Qcontrol. The attacker
performs DFRFT without the control sequence Qcontrol. Both the legitimate receiver and
the attacker perform channel decoding as:
Y = Ψ2 (V) (5.14)
Z = Ψ2 (Ve) (5.15)
where Ψ2 is channel decoding function, which is an invertible function of the channel
encoding function χ2. Then security decoding is performed as following:
S˜ = Ψ1 (Y) (5.16)
S˜e = Ψ1 (Z) (5.17)
where Ψ1 is security decoding function, which is an invertible function of security encoding
function χ1.
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5.5 Simulation Results
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Figure 5.6: Received results of legitimate partners and attackers that put the security code on
the top of the IDFRFT under α1 = 0
o with α2 changing from α1 to α1 + 90
o.
The proposed Construction 4.1 is based on binary resilient functions (n,m, d− 1),
which can be generated by a corresponding linear code (n,m, d). In the experiment we
implemented simplex codes (2m − 1,m, 2m−1), which are the dual of Hamming codes, so
as to yield a (2m − 1,m, 2m−1 − 1) linear resilient function. Figure 4.3 shows the BER
after applying the security codes versus the crossover probability p of the BSC before
applying the security codes.
Corresponding to Figure 5.2-Figure 5.4, the security codes in Figure 4.3 are put onto
the cross-layer model under AWGN channel and Rayleigh channel. The WG stream ci-
phers [115] are employed to generate the control sequences. The security codes (7, 3, 2/7),
(15, 4, 4/15) and (31, 5, 8/31) are put on the top of the cross model in Figure 5.6 to Figure
5.8, respectively.
Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 illustrate the received results when the rotation
angle α1 and α2 taken different value after combining with security codes. In Figure 5.6,
the rotation angle α1 taken 0
o and the rotation angle α2 will change from α1 to α1 + 90
o.
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Figure 5.8: Received results of legitimate partners and attackers that put the security code on
the top of the IDFRFT under α1 = 272
o.
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In Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 the rotation angle α1 taken 0
o and 272o, respectively while
the rotation angle α2 will change from α1 to α1 + 0.1
o. In Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8, we
can know that the BER of legitimate receivers are 0.007 to 2.016 × 10−4 when BER of
attackers is approaching to 0.5, which means that the security system achieves almost
error-free transmissions for the legitimate partners while zero information obtained by
the attackers.
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In this chapter, a USRP testbed is presented, under which the physical layer security
transmission system is built. Security communication between users are successfully
established and performance of this USRP platform shows that the security condition
Eq. (2.3) and reliability Eq. (2.4) can be realized in the actual environment.
6.1 Security Communication System Platform
The security communication system platform is designed as an universal platform, on
which MIMO and single antenna systems all can be run. Here we mainly introduce the
performance of the single antenna system associated with the security codes to build the
unconditional communication security system, in which one to three Eves are presented
in the system. The system scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. Because the platform adopt
the broadband transmission, the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
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technology is used. Even if the platform can provide multiple antennas, here we only use
single antenna of the system in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The security system scenario with one to three Eves
An USRP device is an open source software defined radio platform, which consist
of a motherboard and two UBX160 daughter boards and vert2450 antennas are used.
Motherboard is equipped with a dual 14-bit Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) operating
at 100MHz and dual 16-dit Digital to Analog Converter(DAC)operating at 400MHz,
and UBX160 transceiver daughter boards that act as a front end and have a frequency
range from 10MHz to 6GHz [118]. Each USRP installed two transmit antennas and two
receive antennas. Twelve USRP devices are used to build this security communication
platform, whose is shown in Figure 6.2. The platform consists of five groups of wireless
communication devices, called base stations, UE01, UE02, UE03 and UE04. The number
of base stations and UE01 antennas is eight, the number of UE02 antennas is four, and
the number of antennas for UE03 and UE04 is two. The four users—UE01, UE02, UE03
and UE04 can be the receiver or sender, and UE01, UE02, UE03 and UE04 can be
either legitimate receiver or transmitter, or can be eavesdropper or attacking end. The
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four users can establish a communication link with the base station at the same time.
But only one user can establish a trust connection with the base station, that is, as a
legitimate user, the other three users are regarded as eavesdroppers.
Figure 6.2: The security communication platform
6.2 The Communication Link of the Security Com-
munication Platform
In the test, the base station transmits the signals and the other four users receive the
signals and process the data to output results. Four users also will send pilot signals
to the base station while the base station will choose one as a legitimate partner and
perform handshaking with it and build trust connect with the channel estimation.
84
Chapter 6. Testbed for Unconditionally Secure Communications
6.2.1 The signal processing at the transmitter
The base station as the transmitter, the signal processing flow chart in the transmitter is
shown in Figure 6.3, in which the dashed line frame represents the signal process of the
DFRFT transmitter system. It is assumed that the base station has discussed with all
other four users, and has determined who is legitimate partner and pre-shares the control
sequence Qcontrol in Eq. (5.11) with its partner. The signal processing flow chart in the
Figure 6.3: Signal processing flow chart of the DFRFT security system in the USRP
transmitter
transmitter as following. firstly, enter the information messages that need to be sent and
they will go through security encoding, channel encoding, QAM (Quadarature Amplitude
Modulation) modulation, serial and parallel conversion. Then IDFRFT is performed, in
which the parameters of DFRFT is chosen by Eq. (5.11) according to the pre-shared the
control sequence Qcontrol. Thirdly, Cyclic Prefix (CP) is inserted. Finally, pulse shaping
is made and Digital-Analog Conversion (DAC) is launched, which is transmitted through
USRPs RF.
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6.2.2 The signal processing at the receiver
The implementation flow of the received signal is shown in Figure 6.4, in which the dashed
box represents the signal processing of the DFRFT system in the receiving end. Firstly,
the signals that are received by the Radio Frequency (RF) performs Analog-to-Digital
Conversion (ADC) and matched filtering to pass the signal to the host for core algorithm
processing. Then serial and parallel conversion is performed. Then the CP is removed
and the channel estimation is performed. Thirdly, verify the identity information (legal
or illegal) is performed, DFRFT is carried out, in which the legitimate partner chooses
the parameters of DFRFT by Eq. (5.11) according to the pre-shared the control sequence
Qcontrol while the Eve only can use the guessed control sequence Q
g
control to determine the
parameters of DFRFT. Finally, QAM demodulation, the secure decoding and channel
decoding are carried to get the recovered security information and output. The BERs
are calculated from the input signal and displayed on the front panel.
Figure 6.4: Signal processing flow chart of the DFRFT security system in the USRP
receiver
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6.3 Experimental Results
The system parameters are listed in Table 6.1 and the parameters of USRP devices are
listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1: System parameters
Parameters Values
The number of subcarriers 128
The number of tested frames 100000
The number of OFDM symbols 30
The number of cyclic prefix samples 32
The training symbols for synchronization 8
Table 6.2: USRP settings
Parameters Values
The center frequency 3.5 GHz
The subcarrier interval 15 KHZ
The rate of I/Q 1M bit/s
The maximum transmit power 15 dBm
The channel gain 20 dB
The number of taps for multipath channel 16
The type of modulation QAM
In the performance, four users—UE01, UE02, UE03 and UE04 randomly act as the
legitimate user or eavesdroppers. Lets take an example, in which user UE01 acts as
legitimate user and other users as illegal users. the following results are displayed and
analyzed.
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As shown in Figure 6.5, the base station randomly selects UE01 as the legitimate user
and sends out the security messages. Therefore, the first lamp of four user identification
lamps is green and other three lamps are red. The waveform of the transmitting signal
is shown on the front panel. The front panel of the legal user UE01 is shonw in Figure
6.6, in which the lamp of ”user status” is green. The eight waveform boxes on the left
represent the waveform of the received signals of the eight slots. The constellation on the
right shows the constellation of the data recovered by the user UE01. The constellation
of the decoder is highly convergent from the diagram. The average error rate of 1000
frames is 2.41× 10−6.
Figure 6.5: The front panel of the base station
Figure 6.7 is the front panel of UE02 who acts as illegal user. Therefore, the lamp of
”user status” is red. The constellation of UE02 is scattered and disorganized at random,
and the average error rate of 1000 frames is 0.499768. Figure 6.8 is the front panel of
UE03 who also acts as illegal user and the lamp of ”user status” is red. Same as that of
UE02, the constellation of UE03 is scattered and disorganized at random.
In every test, the base station randomly select one of four users as the legitimate user
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Figure 6.6: The front panel of UE01
and the total 1000 frames will be sent and the length of one frame is 1024 bits. Four users
will alternately act as legal and illegal user and they received signals and try to recover
the security messages. Every user will calculate its BERs in every frame and counts the
average BERs at the end of 1000 received frames. Average BER of every user is shown
in Table 6.3, in which 100 times tests are repeated and the total number of tested frames
are 105.
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Figure 6.7: The front panel of UE02
Figure 6.8: The front panel of UE03
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Table 6.3: Average BER of every user
Received BER of legitimate users
UE01 UE02 UE03 UE04
UE01 2.41× 10−6 0.49900790 0.49938789 0.49956789
UE02 0.49976814 4.72× 10−6 0.49947343 0.49975389
UE03 0.49974731 0.49912165 8.91× 10−6 0.49988674
UE04 0.49974749 0.49912645 0.49929985 8.36× 10−6
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7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have
• Under the theory of Shannon and Wyner, a two-step unconditional model is given,
in which the first step is build the advanced main channel and followed step is to
choose a suitable security codes. Following this model, a novel wiretap channel
built method called MRTWC is proposed, in which manipulating feedback mech-
anisms adds randomness to the feedback signals from the destination for keeping
the eavesdropper ignorant and the redundancy is added and encoded by the LDPC
codes such that a legitimate receiver can correctly receive and decode the signals.
BERs of the proposed method are derived according to the crossover probability
in the case of BSC, or the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the case of AWGN
and Rayleigh channels. The representation of bit Log-likelihood Ratios (LLR) for
optimal soft information decoding and demodulation is extracted.
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• As effort of the second step, a low complexity encoding method of security codes
is developed by taking advantage of a matrix general inverse algorithm, which
is suitable to all kinds of coset security codes. Several families of binary and non-
binary security codes with low complexity are constructed by the resilient functions.
The threshold probabilities of novel security codes are derived, which provides the
strong security proof for the proposed security codes.
• A scheme to build the secure communications via a cross-layer method based on
DFRFT is proposed. By combining cryptographic techniques implemented in the
higher layer with the physical layer security scheme using random parameters flip-
ping of DFRFT, where the channel advantage of the intended receiver is ensured
first by DFRFT and IDFRFT processing controlled by higher layer cryptography.
The advantages of the legitimate partners are continuously extended by developing
the security codes on top of our cross-layer DFRFT security communication model.
A strong secure model for mobile communications is built. The extensive experi-
ments are illustrated to verify the proposed security systems and demonstrate its
feasibility and implement ability.
7.2 Further Research
The following issues could be further investigated:
• LLR extraction model for MRTWC under Rayleigh channel still left for opening.
In the two-step joint scheme, experiments only can perform under bit-flipping de-
coding method under Rayleigh channel, which is not the optimal decoding method.
The security capacity can not exactly evaluated. Therefore, LLR extraction under
Rayleigh channel is necessary to develop in the future.
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• The binary and non-binary resilient functions are a big family of cryptographic
function, which provides a good way to construct provable secure and optimal
security codes. It is deserve to explore the method to construct novel binary or non-
binary security codes by other cryptographic functions. Particularly, the proposed
non-binary security codes have better performance than that of binary security
codes. Therefore, the future research can pay more attention to construct novel
non-binary security codes.
• Although mobility is an intrinsic property of wireless networks, the impact of mo-
bility on wireless physical layer security is not well understood. The physical layer
security in the scenario with a random mobile receiver is deserve to investigate in
the futuer.
• This thesis considers the framework of associating advantages build of the main
channel with secure code to achieve unconditional secure communications under
the single antenna system. More scenarios that joint advanced channel building
and security codes could be considered. Such as, in cooperative security system
how to build the advantages of the main channel by cooperative partners and
associates with the security codes to satisfy the security and reliability conditions
are the future research topic.
• The most results of the cross-layer security technologies are based on the simu-
lation study. It is deserve to do more deep research work about the theoretical
development in the cross-layer approach.
• The physical layer security schemes are at the expense of bandwidth. In the practi-
cal communication scenarios, it is suitable to use the physical layer security scheme
to enhance the wireless system security when the bandwidth is rich. Therefore,
a physical layer transmission method based on the channel prediction and users
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Quality-of-Service (QoS) is deserved to study in the future, in which the system ca-
pacity is calculated and the judgement whether the extra capacity can be provided
for the physical layer security scheme by the channel prediction.
95
Bibliography
[1] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol.
29, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[2] M. Agiwal, A. Roy and N. Saxena, “Next generation 5G wireless networks: a com-
prehensive survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 18,
2016.
[3] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, X. Wang, et al., “A survey on wireless security: technical chal-
lenges, recent advances, and future trends,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 104, no.
9, pp.1727-1765, 2016.
[4] X. Chen, D. W. Kwan, W. H. Gerstacker, H, Chen, “A survey on multiple-antenna
techniques for physical layer security,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 1027 - 1053, 2017.
[5] M. Kamel, W. Hamouda, A. Youssef, “ Physical layer security in ultra-dense net-
works,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, 2017.
[6] B. Chen, C. Zhu, W. Li, J. Wei, V. C. M. Leung, L. T. Yang, “Original symbol
phase rotated secure transmission against powerful massive MIMO eavesdropper,”
IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 3016 - 3025, 2016.
96
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[7] F. Zhu, F. Gao, T. Zhang, K. Sun, M. Yao, “Physical-layer security for full duplex
communications with self-interference mitigation,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 329 - 340, 2016.
[8] Z. Qin, Y. Liu, Z. Ding, Y. Gao, M. Elkashlan, “Physical layer security for 5G
non-orthogonal multiple access in large-scale networks,” 2016 IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 1-6, 2016.
[9] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387,
Oct. 1975.
[10] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “Wire tap channel II,”, AT&T Bell Labs. Tech. J.,
vol. 63, no. 10, pp. 2135-2157, Dec. 1984.
[11] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “Wire-tap channel II,” in Proc. EUROCRYPT 84
workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory andapplication of cryptographic tech-
niques. New York, NY, USA: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.,pp.33-51. 1985.
[12] A.O. Hero, “Secure space-time communication,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol.
49, no. 12, pp. 3235–3249, Dec. 2003.
[13] F. Zhou, Z. Li, J. Cheng, et. al, “Robust AN-aided beamforming and power split-
ting design for secure MISO cognitive Radio With SWIPT,” IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, vol.16, no. 4, pp.2450 - 2464, 2017.
[14] T. R. Dean, A. J. Goldsmith, “Physical-Layer Cryptography Through Massive MI-
MO,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol.63, no. 8, pp.5419 - 5436,
2017.
97
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[15] W. Wu, S. Wu, B. Wang Robust, “Multi-objective beamforming design for power
efficient and secure communication in MU-MISO networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5,
pp. 13277 - 13285, 2017.
[16] M. Zhao, X. Wang, Suili Feng, “Joint power splitting and secure beamforming design
in the multiple non-regenerative wireless-powered relay networks,” IEEE Commu-
nications Letters, vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 1540 - 1543, 2015.
[17] H. M. Wang, M. Luo, X. Xia, et. al “Joint cooperative beamforming and jamming
to secure AF relay systems with individual power constraint and no eavesdroppers
CSI,” IEEE transactions on signal processing Letter, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 39-42, 2013.
[18] A. Mukherjee, A. L. Swindlehurst, , “Robust beamforming for security in MIMO
wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,” IIEEE transactions on signal processing, vol.
59, no. 1, pp. 351-361, 2011.
[19] S. Goel, R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE transactions
on wireless communications, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 2180-2189, Jun. 2008.
[20] A. Khisti, G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas I: the MI-
MOME wiretap channel,” in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no.
7, pp. 3088-3104, 2010.
[21] A. Khisti, G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas II: the MI-
SOME wiretap channel,” in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no.
10, pp. 5515-5532, 2010.
[22] X. He, A. Khisti, A. Yener, “MIMO broadcast channel with an unknown eavesdrop-
per: secrecy degrees of freedom,” IEEE Transactions on Communication, vol. 62,
pp. 246-255, 2014.
98
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[23] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, et. al, “Improving wireless physical layer security
via cooperating relays,” IEEE transactions on signal processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp.
1875-1888, 2010.
[24] L. Hu, H. Wen, B. Wu, J. Tang, and F. Pan, “Adaptive secure transmission for
physical layer security in cooperative wireless networks,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol.
21, no. 3, pp. 524-527, 2017.
[25] L. Hu, H. Wen, B. Wu, J. Tang, and F. Pan, “Adaptive base station cooperation for
physical layer security in two-cell wireless networks,” IEEE Access,vol. 4, pp.5607-
5623, 2016.
[26] L. Hu, B. Wu, J. Tang, F. Pan, and H. Wen, “Outage constrained secrecy rate
maximization using artificial-noise aided beamforming and cooperative jamming,”
IEEE ICC, Kuala Lumpur, 1-5, 2016.
[27] L. Hu, H. Wen, B. Wu, J. Tang, F. Pan, Z. Zhang, Y. Jiang, and A. Xu, “Co-
operative jamming aided secrecy enhancement in wireless networks with multiple
eavesdroppers,” IEEE VTC Fall, Toronto, accepted for publication, 2017.
[28] L. Hu, H. Wen, J. Tang, Z.-Q. He, and J. Su, “Joint cooperative jamming and
beamforming for secure transmission in two-cell networks,” IEEE/CIC ICCC Wk-
sps., Shenzhen, pp.1-5, 2015.
[29] M. L. Ammari, P. Fortier, “Physical layer security of multiple-input-multiple-output
systems with transmit beamforming in Rayleigh fading,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 1096-1103, 2015.
[30] W. C. Liao,, T. J. Chang, W. K. Ma, et. al, “QoS-based transmit beamforming in
the presence of eavesdroppers: an optimized artificial-noise-aided approach,” IEEE
transactions on signal processing, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1202-1215, 2011.
99
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[31] G. Cohen and G. Zmor, Syndrome-coding for the wiretap channel revisited, in Proc.
IEEE Information Theory Workshop, pp. 33C36, Chengdu, China, Oct. 2006.
[32] M. Andersson, V. Rathi, R. Thobaben, J. Kliewer, and M. Skoglund, “Nested polar
codes for wiretap and relay channels,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 14, pp.
752-754, June 2010.
[33] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. R. Calderbank, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla,
“Applications of LDPC codes to the wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 53, pp. 2933-2945, Aug. 2007.
[34] A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, and S. McLaughlin, “Strong secrecy on
the binary erasure wiretap channel using large-girth ldpc codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 6, pp. 585 -594, Sept. 2011.
[35] S. El Rouayheb, E. Soljanin, A. Sprintson, “Secure network coding for wiretap net-
works of Type II,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.58, no.3, pp. 1361-1371, 2012.
[36] G. J. Foschini, M. J. Gans, ”On limits of wireless communications in a fading en-
vironment when using multiple antennas,” Wireless Personal Commun., Kluwer
Academic Press, no. 6, pp. 311-335, 1998.
[37] Yanbing Zhang and Huaiyu Dai, ”A unitary space-time coding scheme for UWB
systems and its application in wireless secure communications”, in Proc. 2006 IEEE
International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal, vol. 4, pp.4-10, 14-19 May
2006.
[38] X. Li and J. Hwu, “Using antenna array redundancy and channel diversity for secure
wireless transmissions,” Journal of Communications, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 24–32, May
2007.
100
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[39] H. Kim and J. D. Villasenor, “Secure MIMO communcications in a system with
equal numbers of transmit and receive antennas,” IEEE Communications Letters,
vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 386–388, May 2008.
[40] Lifeng Lai, Praveen K. Gopala and Hesham El Gamal, ”Secure communications over
wireless channels,” in Proc. ITA 2007, pp.1-5, Jan. 2007.
[41] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general gaussian multiple-access and two-way wire-tap
channels: achievable rates and cooperative jamming,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2735-2751, June, 2008.
[42] S. Ali. A. Fakoorian and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Solutions for the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Process-
ing, vol. 59, no.10, pp. 5013-5022, 2011.
[43] F. Renna, N. Laurenti and H. V. Poor, “Physical-layer secrecy for OFDM trans-
missions over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol.7, no.4, pp.
1354-1367, 2012.
[44] Lifeng Lai, Yingbin Liang and H. V. Poor, “A unified framework for key agreement
over wireless fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 7, pp.480-
490, 2012.
[45] C. Wang, H.-M. Wang, X.-G. Xia, et al., “Uncoordinated jammer selection for se-
curing SIMOME wiretap channels: A stochastic geometry approach,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., 2015, 14(5): 2596-2612.
[46] J. Tang, H. Wen, L. Hu, et al., “Associating MIMO beamforming with security
codes to achieve unconditional communication security,” IET Commun., vol.10, no.
12, pp.1522-1531, 2016.
101
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[47] R. Zhao, Y. Huang, W. Wang, et al., “Ergodic achievable secrecy rate of multiple-
antenna relay systems with cooperative jamming,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 2537-2551, 2016.
[48] X. Hu, P. Mu, B. Wang, et al., “On the secrecy rate maximization with uncoordi-
nated cooperative jamming by single-antenna helpers,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.,
2016, [DOI]: 10.1109/TVT.2016.2599223.
[49] D. Wang, B. Bai, W. Chen, et al., “Secure green communication via untrusted two-
way relaying: A physical layer approach,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 5,
pp. 1861-1874, 2016.
[50] M. Haus, M. Waqas, A. Y. Ding, et al., “Security and privacy in Device-to-Device
(D2D) communication: A review,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tut., 2017. [DOI]:
10.1109/COMST.2017.2649687.
[51] M. Alam, D. Yang, J. Rodriguez, et al., “Secure device-to-device communication in
LTE-A,” IEEE Commun Mag., pp.66-73, vol. 52, no. 4, 2014.
[52] G. Fodor, S. Parkvall, S. Sorrentino, et al., “Device-to-device communications for
national security and public safety,” IEEE Access, vol.2, pp.1510-1520, 2014.
[53] H. Zhang, T. Wang, L. Song, et al., “Radio resource allocation for physical-layer
security in D2D underlay communications,” IEEE ICC, pp.2319-2324, Sydney, Aus-
tralia,, 2014.
[54] D. Zhu, A. L. Swindlehurst, S. A. A. Fakoorian, et al., “Device-to-device communi-
cations: The physical layer security advantage,” IEEE ICASSP, Florence, Italy, pp.
1606-1610, 2014.
102
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[55] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39, pp. 733-742, 1993.
[56] C. Candan, M. A. Kutay, and H. M. Ozaktas, “The discrete fractional Fourier trans-
form,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1329-1337, May 2000.
[57] E. H. Elshazly, M. A. Ashour, E. M. Elrabaie, and A. M. Abbas, “An efficient
fractional Fourier transform approach for digital image watermarking,” in Proc.
29th Nat. Radio Sci. Conf. (NRSC), Apr. 2012, pp. 245-254.
[58] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, J. H. astad, J. Friedman, S. Rudich, and R. Smolensky, “The
bit extraction problem or t-resilient functions,” in IEEE Symp. on Foundations of
Computer Science,vol. 26, pp. 396-407, 1985.
[59] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and J. M. Robert, “Privacy amplification by public
discussion,” SIAM J. Comput., vol. 17, pp. 210-229, 1988.
[60] Jrgen Bierbrauer, K. Gopalakrishnan, and D. R. Stinson, “Orthogonal arrays, re-
silient functions, error-correcting codes, and linear programming bounds,” SIAM J.
Discrete Math. vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 424-452, 1996.
[61] Mahdavifar. H, Vardy. A, “Achieving the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels using
polar codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 6428-
6443, 2011.
[62] H. Wen, G. Gong, P. H. Ho, “Achieving secure communications over wiretap channels
via security codes from resilient functions,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters,
vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 273-276, 2014.
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[63] S. Thangaraj, A. R. Calderbank, et. al, “Applications of LDPC codes to the wiretap
channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 2933-2945,
2007.
[64] M. Yi, X. S. Ji, K. Z. Huang, et. al, “Achieving strong security based on fountain
code with coset pre-coding,” IET Communication, vol. 8, no. 9, pp. 2476-2483, 2014.
[65] H. Wen, G. Gong, P. H. Ho, “Build-in wiretap channel I with feedback and LDPC,”
Journal of Communications and Networks, vol. 11, no. 12, pp. 24-32, 2009.
[66] I. Csiszar and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 24, no.3, pp. 339-348, May 1978.
[67] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong, “On a special class of wire-tap channels,” IEEE Trans. In-
form. Theory, vol. 23, no.5, pp. 625-627, Sept. 1977.
[68] M. van Dijk, “On a special class of broadcast channels with confidentail messages,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 43, no.3, pp. 733-742, May 1997.
[69] R.G.Gallager, “Low-density parity-check codes,”IRE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol.
IT-8, no. 1, pp. 21-28, 1968.
[70] M.R.David, Single parity check product codes and iterative decoding, Phd Thesis,
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Canterbury,
New Zealand, 2001.
[71] G. Cohen and G. Zmor, The wire-tap channel applied to biometrics, in Proc. Int.
Symp. Information Theory and its Applications, Parma, Italy, Oct. 2004.
[72] Hagenauer, J., Offer, E., Papke, L., “Iterative decoding of binary block and convo-
lutional codes,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 429-445, 1996.
104
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[73] Baldi, M., Cancellieri, G., Carassai, A., et al., “LDPC codes based on serially con-
catenated multiple parity-check codes,”IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 13, no. 2, pp.
142-144, 2009.
[74] S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Ye, and A. Reznik, “Radio telepathy:
extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless channel,” in MobiCom’08:
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and
networking. ACM, pp. 128-139, 2008.
[75] Kai Zeng and Daniel Wu, An (Jack) Chan and Prasant Mohapatra“Exploiting
multiple-Antenna diversity for shared secret key generation in wireless networks,”
IEEE INFOCOM 2010, pp.1-9, 2010.
[76] Hadi Ahmadi and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, “Secret keys from channel noise,” EURO-
CRYPT 2011, pp.266-283, 2011.
[77] Hongsong Shi, Shaoquan Jiang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Mohammed Ashraful
Tuhin, “On optimal secure message transmission by public discussion,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no.1, pp.572-585, 2011.
[78] Bhavana Kanukurthi and Leonid Reyzin, “Key agreement from close secrets over
unsecured channels,” EUROCRYPT2009,. pp. 206-223.
[79] Q. Chai and G. Gong, “BUPLE: securing passive RFID communication through
physical layer enhancements,” 7th Annual Workshop on RFID Security and Privacy
(RFIDsec’11), Amherst, MA, USA, June, 2011.
[80] S. L. Campbell and C. D. Meyer, Jr., “Generalized Inverses of Linear Transforma-
tions,” Pitman, London, 1979.
105
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[81] M.Z.Nashed, ed., “Generalized Inverses and Applications,” Academic Press, New
York,1976.
[82] G. H. Golub and C. F. Van Loan, Matrix Computations. Baltimore, MD, USA: The
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2012.
[83] H. Wen, P. Ho and X. Jiang, “On achieving unconditional secure communications
over binary symmetric channels (BSC),” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters,
vol.1, no. 2,pp.49-52, 2012.
[84] F. J. MacWilliams and N. J. A. Sloane, “The theory of error correcting codes,”
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977.
[85] K. Gopalakrishnan , D. R. Stinson, “Three characterizations of non-binary
correlation-immune and resilient functions,” vol.5, pp. 241-251, 1995.
[86] P. Camion and A. Canteaut, “Construction of t-resilient functions over a finite al-
phabet,” Proceedings of EUROCRYPT’96, pp. 283-293, 1996.
[87] D. R. Stinson, “On some methods for unconditionally secure key distribution and
broadcast encryption,” Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol. 12, pp.215-243, 1997.
[88] S. Afreen, N. Ikram, “Resilient function based sequence generator-RFSG,” Computer
Science Journal, vol.1, no. 1, pp.7-15, 2011.
[89] L. Xu and C. Huang, “Computation-efficient multicast key distribution,” IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol.19, no. 5, pp.577-587, 2008
[90] C. Ding, G. Xiao and W. Shan, “The stability theory of stream ciphers (Lecture
notes in computer science),” Berlin, Germany, Springer-Verlag, vol. 561, 1991.
[91] K. Gopalakrishnan, “A study of correlation-immune, resilient and related crypto-
graphic functions,” PhD. Thesis, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 1994.
106
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[92] Irving S. Reed and G. Solomon, “Polynomial codes over certain finite fields,” Journal
of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM), vol. 8, no. 2, pp.300-
304, 1960.
[93] N. Suresh Babu, “Studies on rank distance codes,” Ph.D Dissertation, IIT Madras,
Feb. 1995.
[94] J. G. Proakis, “Digital Communications,” 4th Ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 2001.
[95] C. Berrou, A. Glavieux and P. Thitimajshima, “Near shannon limit error correcting
coding and decoding: turbo codes,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun., Geneva,
Switzerland, pp. 1064-1070, 1993.
[96] H. Behairy and S.-C. Chang, “Parallel concatenated gallager codes,” Electron. Lett.,
vol.36, no.24, pp. 2025-2026, 2000.
[97] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Wireless information-theoretic security,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2515-2534, 2008.
[98] V. U. Prabhu, , M. R. D. Rodrigues, “ On wireless channels with antenna eavesdrop-
pers: characterization of the outage probability and outage secrecy capacity,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 9, pp. 853-860, 2011.
[99] S. Gerbracht, C. Scheunert, E. A. Jorswieck, “Secrecy outage in MISO systems
with partial channel information,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 704-716, 2012.
[100] M. L. S. Kundu, D. A. Pados, S. N. Batalama, “Waveform design for secure SISO
transmissions and multicasting,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1864-1873, 2013.
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[101] W. C. Liao,, T. J. Chang, W. K. Ma, et. al, “QoS-based transmit beamforming in
the presence of eavesdroppers: an optimized artificial-noise-aided approach,” IEEE
transactions on signal processing, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 1202-1215, 2011.
[102] X. Li, “Blind channel estimation and equalization in wireless sensor networks based
on correlations among sensors,” in IEEE transactions on signal processing, vol. 53,
no. 4, pp. 1511-1519, 2005.
[103] L. Liu, J. Liang, K. Z. Huang, “Eavesdropping against artificial noise: hyperplane
clustering,” in Proc. ICIST,, YangZhou, China, pp. 1571-1575, March. 2013,
[104] Y. Gu, N. A. Goodman, S. Hong, et. al “Robust adaptive beamforming based on
interference covariance matrix sparse reconstruction,” Elsevier Signal Process, vol.
96, no. 10, pp. 375-381, Jul. 2013.
[105] Y. Gu, A. Leshem, ‘Robust adaptive beamforming based on interference covariance
matrix reconstruction and steering vector estimation,” IEEE transactions on signal
processing, vol. 60, no. 7, pp. 3881-3885, 2012.
[106] Q.-W. Ran, H.-Y. Zhang, Z.-Z. Zhang, and X.-J. Sha, “The analysis of the discrete
fractional Fourier transform algorithms,” in Proc. Can. Conf. Elect. Comput. Eng.
(CCECE), May 2009, pp. 979-982.
[107] S.-C. Pei and W.-L. Hsue, “The multiple-parameter discrete frac- tional Fourier
transform,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 329-332, Jun. 2006.
[108] A. Mostayed, K. Sikyung, and S. Z. K. Sajib, “Novel parameter estimation method
for chirp signals using Bowtie Chirplet and discrete fractional Fourier transform,”
in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Future Generat. Commun. Netw. Symp. (FGCNS), vol. 3.
Dec. 2008, pp. 23-26.
108
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[109] A. M. Youssef, “On the security of a cryptosystem based on multiple- parameters
discrete fractional Fourier transform,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 15, no. 1, pp.
77-78, Jan. 2008.
[110] R. Tao, X.-Y. Meng, and Y. Wang, “Image encryption with multiorders of fractional
Fourier transforms,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 734-738,
Dec. 2010.
[111] N. Jindal and K. Singh, “Image encryption using discrete fractional transforms,”
in Proc. Int. Conf. Adv. Recent Technol. Commun. Comput., 2010, pp. 165-167.
[112] N. Ghoshal and J. K. Mandal, “Discrete Fourier transform based multimedia colour
image authentication for wireless communication (DFTMCIAWC),” in Proc. Int.
Conf. Wireless VITAE, Feb./Mar. 2011, pp. 1-5.
[113] W. Yaqing and Z. Shangbo, “A novel image encryption algorithm based on frac-
tional Fourier transform,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput. Sci. Service Syst. (CSSS),
Jun. 2011, pp. 72-75.
[114] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Crepeau, and U. M. Maurer, “Generalized privacy
amplification,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1915-1923, Nov. 1955.
[115] Y. Nawaz and G. Gong, “WG: A family of stream ciphers with designed randomness
properties,” Inf. Sci., vol. 178, no. 7, pp. 1903-1916, 2008.
[116] M. H. Ozaktas, O. Arikan, M. A. Kutay, and G. Bozdagt, “Digital computation of
the fractional Fourier transform,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 44, no. 9, pp.
2141-2150, Sep. 1996.
109
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[117] M. Martone, “A multicarrier system based on the fractional Fourier transform for
time-frequency-selective channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 1011-
1020, Jun. 2001.
[118] M. Ettus, Universal software radio peripheral, Ettus Research, Mountain View,
CA, www.ettus.com, 2012.
110
Appendix A: Published Papers
• Hong Wen, Tang Jie, Jinsong Wu, Huanhuan Song, Pin-han Ho, A Cross-layer
Secure Communication Model Based on Discrete Fractional Fourier Transform (D-
FRFT), IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, vol. 3, no. 1,
pp.119-126, Mar. 2015.
• Hong Wen, Pin-han Ho, Bin Wu, Achieving Secure Communications over Wiretap
Channels via Security Codes from Resilient Functions, IEEE Wireless Communi-
cation Letter, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 273-276, 2014.
• Hong Wen, Pin-han Ho, Xiaohong Jiang, On Achieving Unconditional Secure Com-
munications over Binary Symmetric Channels (BSC), IEEE Wireless Communica-
tions Letters, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.49-52, Apr. 2012.
• Hong Wen, Guang Gong, Shi-Chao Lv and Pin-han Ho, Framework for MIMO
Cross-Layer Secure Communication Based on STBC, Telecommunication Systems,
vol.47, no.3, pp. 1-9, Agu. 2013.
• Hong Wen, Pin-han Ho, A Novel Scheme of Detecting the Sybil Attack Based on
Channel Identification, The First International Workshop on Security in Comput-
ers, Networking and Communications, Joint with ICC2012, Ottawa, Canada 10-11
June, 2012.
111
